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Gopnik (1993) reports that young children do not understand their own beliefs before 
they understand the beliefs of other people. Gopnik argues that the young child 
develops a theory of mind which grows in complexity over time, and is simultaneously 
used to explain the child's own behaviour, and that of others, in terms of psychological 
states. Gopnik's position is called "theory theory". Harris (1989, 1991) proposes an 
alternative explanation of Gopnik' s findings, in which the young child does not develop 
a theory of mind, but rather 'simulates' their intuitive understanding of their own 
psychological states in order to explain the behaviour of others. Harris' position is 
called "simulation theory". In the present study a third position is proposed, "first-
person theory theory", which occupies the middle ground between theory theory and 
simulation theory. First-person theory theory states that the young child begins to 
theorise about their own psychological states after having become reflectively aware of 
their own psychological experience or "stream of consciousness", and that the child's 
theory of mind is later used to explain the behaviour of others. The present study tested 
the developmental priority of self knowledge by comparing three-year-old children's 
understanding of false belief in others and representational change in themselves. The 
present study also tested the hypothesis that heightened cognitive involvement, caused 
by participation in the execution of the experimental task, would increase children's 
accuracy on questions about their own false beliefs to a greater degree than it would 
their accuracy on questions about another person's false beliefs. Subjects responded 
with greater accuracy to questions about where they had personally looked for a hidden 
object than they responded to all other test questions. The findings of the present study 
supported the developmental priority of self knowledge proposed by first-person theory 
theory and simulation theory, while constituting evidence against theory theory. 
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During the preschool years, young children begin to develop an understanding of 
psychological states such as perception, desire, and belief. At approximately three to 
four years old the child begins to evidence an understanding of the representational 
nature of belief - that beliefs are about something, and that beliefs can be false ( Gopnik, 
1993). 
The central aim of the present study is to find out whether young children develop 
an understanding of their own false beliefs before they understand the false beliefs of 
others, and whether greater cognitive involvement in situations which involve false 
belief better facilitates the development of the child's understanding of their own false 
beliefs than it does the child's understanding of false belief in others. 
In part one of the introduction, "the child's theory of mind", evidence will be 
presented which suggests that young children, children with autism, and some animals 
do not have the neurological 'equipment' necessary to intuitively understand 
psychological states. I will then argue that the child's developing understanding of 
psychological states is dependent upon a neurological mechanism which is not present 
in some animals, and is damaged in children with autism. I will then discuss the 
specific functional nature of the neurological mechanism, and compare several 
candidates for that specific function. 
In part two of the introduction, I discuss the development of the theory of mind in 
three sections. The three sections describe development during the first three years of 
the child's life, the child's degree of understanding at three years of age, and later 
development, respectively. The subjects in the present study are three years old, and 
part two of the introduction serves to put their level of understanding of psychological 
states in context with the greater developmental process. 
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In part three I will introduce my account of the child's developing understanding 
of psychological states, "first-person theory theory", which provides an alternative to 
the models described in part two of the introduction. 'Hard' theory theorists such as 
Gopnik (1993) claim that the child develops a theory of mind to simultaneously explain 
the child's own behaviour and the behaviour of others. First-person theory theory, on 
the other hand, states that the child's developing theoretical understanding of 
psychological states is first applied to their own behaviour, and is only later applied to 
the behaviour of others. The version of first-person theory theory put forward in part 
three also states that the child's theorising about their own psychological states is 
initiated by the first reflective awareness of their own "stream of consciousness" or 
"psychological experience" (Gopnik, 1993). 
In part four I will introduce the present study. I will describe the study in general 
terms, discuss the interpretation of results, and finally discuss relevant methodological 
issues. 
In summary, the present study is concerned with the developmental priority of self 
knowledge, and the role of awareness of psychological experience in theory of mind 
development. In part one I establish the case for the existence of a theory of mind 
module. In part two I will describe the development of the child's understanding of 
psychological states, which is dependent upon that module. In part three I will present 
the first-person theory theory, and in part four I will introduce the present study, which 
will test first-person theory theory. 
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PART ONE: THE CHILD'S THEORY OF MIND 
In this section evidence is presented that children with autism, some animals, and 
young children lack understanding of psychological states. I will argue that 
understanding of psychological states is dependent upon a specific neurological 
mechanism which is damaged in children with autism. 
Without understanding. 
It is hard for most people to imagine what it would be like to know nothing about 
mental states. Human action is often (if not always) determined by desires, and those 
desires are reliant upon beliefs (Wellman, 1990). For this reason, any person who 
wonders about the causes of human behaviour and is unaware of desire and belief is 
going to be a long way froni a full understanding of why people do many apparently 
inexplicable things, such as walking in and out of rooms (Baron-Cohen, 1995). 
Whenever we have a conversation with another person we take into account that 
person's beliefs, desires, and perceptions. We can lie or deceive others because we 
understand that they can hold false beliefs. An understanding of the representational 
nature of the mind, that mental states refer to some content and can often be false, 
greatly facilitates our everyday lives. 
Thinking about the number of things that a person couldn't do if they did not have 
an appreciation of "mind", it soon becomes apparent that such a deficit would have 
disastrous social consequences for the afflicted individual. As most people do not like 
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to feel constantly bewildered or unsure of their surroundings, such a person might 
withdraw from social interaction or keep to themselves. 
Kanner (1943) described a group of people who appeared to fit this description 
exactly. Extracts from some of his descriptions of the children he observed include the 
following: 
"He seems almost to draw into his shell and live within himself..." 
"When taken into a room, he completely disregarded the people and instantly 
went for objects ... " 
"When a hand was held out to him so that he could not possibly ignore it, he 
played with it briefly as if it were a detached object..." 
"He did not respond to being called, and did not look at his mother when she 
k h. " spo e to 1m ... 
" ... on a crowded beach he would walk straight toward his goal irrespective of 
whether this involved walking over newspapers, hands, feet, or torsos, much 
to the discomfiture of their owners. His mother was careful to point out that 
he did not intentionally deviate from his course in order to walk on others, 
but neither did he make the slightest attempt to avoid them. It was as if he 
did not distinguish people from things, or at least did not concern himself 
about the distinction." 
The children described by Kanner were autistic, and recent clinical observations 
(e.g. Baron-Cohen and Bolton, 1993) are remarkably similar to Kanner's. Autism 
occurs in approximately four to fifteen children per ten thousand, across social and 
cultural boundaries. There appears to be a genetic basis to the disorder, with a higher 
than chance rate of children who are closely related to a child with autism also having 
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the condition. In cases where autistic children have siblings, the rate of autism in their 
brothers and sisters is approximately two percent, which is a morbidity risk fifty times 
greater than that of the general population (Rutter, 1967). Folstein and Rutter (1978) 
found that in ten pairs of fraternal twins, one of whom in each pair had autism, not one 
of the other twins were autistic. In eleven pairs of identical twins ( one of whom had 
autism), however, thirty six percent of the co-twins were also autistic. Autism is 
associated with biological abnormalities such as mental handicap, epilepsy, and various 
other brain pathologies (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Folstein and Rutter, 1978). The genetic 
basis of autism causes brain abnormalities, which in turn cause the behavioural 
symptoms of the disorder. If there is a single common brain abnormality shared by 
sufferers of autism, it may be damage to the neurological substrate of a specific 
cognitive function: the ability to develop an understanding of psychological states 
(Baron-Cohen, 1991; Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith, 1985; Leslie, 1987). 
Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith (1985) were the first to ask the question; "does the 
autistic child have a theory of mind?". Baron-Cohen et al. tested children with autism on 
a false belief task using puppets, and concluded that the postulated dysfunction of the 
autistic child's theory of mind was independent of mental retardation and specific to 
autism, which suggests that the cognitive deficit which causes autism is relatively 
specific. The task tested the children's ability to understand that a person (or in this 
case, a puppet) can hold a false belief as one puppet "deceives" another by changing the 
location of a marble while the second puppet is "out of the room". The results of the 
study indicated that children with autism failed the false belief test, while normal 
children and children with Down's syndrome passed. 
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Autism can be diagnosed at a fairly early age on the basis of key symptoms such as 
an inability to form proper infant-mother attachment, and abnormal social and 
communicative development (Baron-Cohen, 1995). Various aspects of the autistic 
child's apparent lack of social competence have been investigated by researchers. 
Children with autism show deficits of pretend-play (Baron-Cohen, 1987; Ungerer and 
Sigman, 1981) or understanding of deception (Russell, Mauthner, Sharpe, and Tidswell, 
1991 ). Children with autism fail to interpret behaviour in terms of intentions, feelings, 
or beliefs (Frith, 1989), false belief (Baron-Cohen, 1988; Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith, 
1985; Perner, Frith, & Leekam, 1989), and desire (Harris and Muncer, 1988). Autistic 
children are, however, as capable as normal children at interpreting a cartoon-strip 
sequence of events which is purely mechanistic. A__n example of a 'mechonistic' cartoon 
sequence is one in which a girl is shown holding a balloon, and when she loses her grip 
the balloon blows away on the wind. An example of a 'mentalistic' cartoon sequence is 
one in which the girl puts down a teddy bear to pick fruit, the teddy bear is taken away 
by another child while the girl looks away, and when she turns back the little girl is 
surprised to see that the bear is missing. The subject must understand psychological 
states in order to successfully put the cartoon in the correct sequence (Baron-Cohen, 
Leslie, and Frith, 1986). 
The case of autism has provided an example of a genetic pathology which causes 
some individuals to be born "mindblind" (Baron-Cohen, 1995). That is, autistic 
individuals do not comprehend the nature of mental states. The apparent existence of a 
genetic pathology which can cause "mindblindness" has led some theorists (Baron-
Cohen, 1995; Leslie, 1987; Leslie, 1991; Leslie, 1994) to posit the existence of a "theory 
of mind module" - a discrete cognitive information processing unit in the brain which is 
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the neurobiological basis of the child's theory of mind, or plays a crucial role in the 
development of that theory. Baron-Cohen (1995) explains that " .. the genetic pathology 
that caused a body to be built without a stomach would be further evidence for the 
evolution of the stomach" (p. l 0). 
Certain animals do not evidence any understanding of psychological states, 
perhaps because the necessary neurological mechanism has not evolved in those species. 
Studies of the behaviour of vervet monkeys in Kenya by Cheney and Seyfarth (1992) 
have shown that these primates apparently have no theory of mind, but rely instead upon 
complicated behavioural observations to predict each other's actions. The evidence for 
this conclusion is that the behaviour of vervet monkeys, ranging from a few simple vocal 
responses to predator avoidance behaviours, does not appear to take the intentional states 
of other monkeys into account. For example, vervet monkeys will give the same vocal 
response to the presence of a predator regardless of whether they are alone or in a group. 
In contrast, a chimpanzee will flee a predator in relative silence if there are no other 
chimpanzees present to hear any distress calls or predator warnings, but if other 
chimpanzees are present it will give the appropriate calls (Cheney and Seyfarth, 1992). 
Baron-Cohen (1993b) and Happe and Frith (1992) have suggested that high-
functioning individuals with autism are those with higher nonsocial intelligence. Those 
individuals with higher nonsocial intelligence may learn to predict the behaviour of 
others on the basis of learned rules and behavioural observation analogous to the method 
used by the vervet monkeys. 
In summary, there is evidence of a specific cognitive deficit in autism which 
apparently has some genetic basis. Coupled with findings that not all of the primates 
exhibit behaviours that would be expected if they had a theory of mind, this evidence has 
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been used to argue for the existence of a neurological module in humans which 
specialises in processing information about the hypothesised mental life of ourselves, 
and of other people. 
The suggestion that animals such as vervet monkeys do not have the necessary 
neurological mechanism to develop understanding of psychological states is intuitively 
compelling, but only one of several possibilities. For example, the proposed 
neurological mechanism may not exist, and the vervet monkeys simply might not have a 
form of social interaction or 'culture' which is conducive to the development of 
understanding of psychological states. 
The evidence from autism for a neurological substrate of the ability to understand 
psychological states is fairly convincing. Autism is characterised by a recurring genetic 
trait which causes brain abnormalities (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Folstein & Rutter, 1978; 
Rutter, 1967). It is probable that a particular brain abnormality which is common to 
autism causes a specific cognitive deficit, and that deficit could in tum cause the major 
symptoms of autism. Baron-Cohen (1995) and Baron-Cohen et al (1985) claim that the 
cognitive deficit responsible for autistic symptomatology is the inability to develop an 
understanding of psychological states. In short, the evidence from autism suggests that 
that the development of understanding of psychological states in normal humans is 
reliant upon a specific neurological substrate. 
Although the existence of a genetic pathology such as autism, which causes an 
individual to be unable to comprehend psychological states, suggests the existence of a 
processing mechanism in the human brain which is responsible for that task, it does not 
indicate the nature or specific function of that mechanism. The possible nature of such a 
mechanism is discussed in the next section. 
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Theory of mind module. 
The evidence from autism discussed in the previous section suggests that the 
development of the ability to understand psychological states in normal humans is 
reliant upon a specific neurological substrate. In this section I will discuss the various 
models of the child's understanding of psychological states which the proposed 
neurological mechanism might support. I will then compare the models of 
understanding, and argue that the child's understanding of psychological states is best 
described as a "theory of mind" (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). The theory of mind, and 
the neurological substrate of that theory, are thereafter referred to as a "theory of mirid 
module" (Fodor, 1983). 
The psychological module is described by Fodor (1983) as being an 
informationally encapsulated computational system. Such systems are said to be semi-
autonomous centres or circuits of neural activity which take care of discrete processing 
tasks without significant interruption or contact by other modules. A set of 
informationally encapsulated modules would allow differentiation of function 
throughout the brain, and theorists have suggested that one such module is either 
explicitly responsible for 'theory of mind' processing, or at least performs a function 
which is necessary for the development of the theory of mind (Baron-Cohen, 1995, 
Brothers and Ring, 1992, Karmiloff-Smith et al, 1995, Leslie, 1987, Leslie, 1991). 
Once we have accepted the possible existence of a module upon which the 
development of understanding of psychological states is dependent, it is prudent to ask 
what specific function this hypothetical module might perform. It can be argued, for 
example, that there is a 'metarepresentation module', a 'social intelligence module', a 
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'simulation module', or a 'theory of mind module'. This section will discuss each 
possible specific function of the proposed module. 
Metarepresentation. 
A good candidate for the function of the proposed module is metarepresentation. 
Leekam and Perner (1991) put forward two distinct definitions of metarepresentation, 
both of which are described here. Metarepresentation can be defined as the process of 
representing representations, and it can also be defined as the process of representing 
mental representations. Whether there is a specific metarepresentation module in the 
human brain, and which type of metarepresentation information that module might be 
responsible for processing, is discussed in this section. 
Leslie (1987) claims that there is a neurobiological system or module which is 
responsible for the capacity for metarepresentation in humans, and that damage to this 
module will lead to an inability to develop a theory of mind. Development of the theory 
of mind depends upon the metarepresentational process for the simple reason that it is 
impossible to think about another person's thoughts (or even one's own thoughts) 
without making representations of representations. 
Leekam and Perner (1991) have criticised Leslie's claim that a theory of mind 
deficit in autism is due to an inhibited ability to metarepresent. Leekam and Perner 
tested autistic children's understanding of photographic representations with Zaitchik's 
(1990) photograph task, which was modelled on the false belief task (Baron-Cohen, 
Leslie, and Frith, 1985; Wimmer and Perner, 1983). In the photograph task, children 
were first instructed on how to use a Polaroid camera. They then took a picture of an 
object in location A. Instead of a person putting an object in location A and leaving the 
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room, as in the false belief task, a photograph is taken of the object in location A. While 
the Polaroid photograph is developing, the object is moved to a new location (B), just as 
in the false belief task. The child then had to predict where the object will be in the 
photograph (Leekam and Perner, 1991, p.206). Although normal subjects could pass 
either test with equal ease, the autistic children could apparently represent the 
representations of a polaroid camera, but not those of the doll. Leekam and Perner 
concluded that the autistic children's failure on the false belief task was not attributable 
to a metarepresentational deficit, or at least not a deficit of metarepresentation as 
defined by Leslie (1987, 1988). Leekam and Perner argued that if autistic children have 
a metarepresentational deficit in Leslie's sense of the term, then they should have 
difficulty not only with mental representations such as false beliefs, but also with 
external representations such as photographs. Leekam and Perner' s results suggest that 
there is a qualitative difference between the metarepresentation of non-mental 
representations, such as the Polaroid, and the metarepresentation of mental 
representations, such as beliefs. In response to Leekam and Perner, Leslie and Thaiss 
(1992) have suggested that the child's understanding of mental states is domain specific, 
and that it develops in parallel with understanding of non-mental representation. 
Although Leslie's (1987) original claim was that young children were unable to perform 
any sort of metarepresentation, mental or non-mental, Leslie and Thaiss (1992) concede 
that young children can in fact represent non-mental representations. 
Leslie (1987, 1988) claims that autistic children do not have a theory of mind 
because of a metarepresentational deficit. Leekam and Perner ( 1991) have 
demonstrated that autistic children are in fact capable of representing non-mental 
representations. The weaker claim, that the development of a theory of mind has been 
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inhibited by a deficit of the ability to represent mental representations may be valid. It 
is not, however, the claim made by Leslie (1987, 1988). If there is a qualitative 
difference between the representation of mental and non-mental representations, then 
there may be a module which is responsible for the ability to represent mental 
representations. The evidence discussed here suggests that there 1s not a 
metarepresentation module upon which development of the ability to understand 
psychological states depends. 
Social intelligence. 
Autistic children and vervet monkeys may have a social intelligence deficit, 
caused by a damaged or missing "social intelligence module". Baron-Cohen (1993b) 
and Happe and Frith (1992) suggest that there may be a functional distinction between 
social and nonsocial intelligence; that autistic individuals with less social impairment 
are those with higher nonsocial intelligence. The term 'social intelligence' is shorthand 
for the ability to process information about the behaviour of others and to react 
adaptively to their behaviour (Baron-Cohen, 1995). It is possible that the difference 
between representing mental representations and learning fixed mechanical rules ( e.g. 
the nature of Polaroid representation) is in fact the difference between social and 
nonsocial intelligence. Autistic individuals with higher nonsocial intelligence may be 
using processes of deduction, which are nonsocial, to "decode" mysterious social 
circumstances which aren't being dealt with by a damaged social intelligence/theory of 
mind module. 
Those individuals with a damaged social intelligence module may be attempting 
to compensate by predicting the behaviour of others on the basis of learned rules, while 
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normal people have a theory of mind which allows one to forego laboriously predicting 
the behaviour of others in non-mentalistic terms. An analogy can be made with a person 
who is attempting to predict the responses of an extremely complex machine on the 
basis of past experience when it would be quicker and easier to simply think of the 
machine as being sentient, or having Intentionality. Intentionality refers to the 
capability to refer to something outside oneself, to have "aboutness" ( e.g. the word 
"bee" refers to a particular type of flying insect). The predictive and adaptive value of 
the "intentional stance", in which one perceives the world as being filled with 
intentional agents, is high (Dennett, 1987). 
The social intelligence deficit described by Happe and Frith (1992) effectively 
canies out the same function as theory of mind modules like those described by Leslie 
(1987), and Baron-Cohen (1995). However, a distinction can be made between a social 
intelligence module and a theory of mind module. The theory of mind module has a 
single specific function; to develop a theoretical model of the human mind which allows 
social interaction to occur with much less accompanying cognition than might otherwise 
have been necessary. In contrast, the social intelligence module may have more than a 
single specific function to perform, such as affective, theory of mind, and symbolic 
pretence processing. If it is true that the difference between social and nonsocial 
intelligence is the difference between representing mental representations and learning 
fixed rules, and nothing more besides, then the social intelligence module is effectively 
a theory of mind module by another name. If the social intelligence module is 
responsible for a wide range of functions which define 'social intelligence', then it is 
qualitatively different to the neural mechanism described by most theorists as a 'theory 
of mind module' (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Leslie, 1987). For example, Brothers and Ring 
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(1992) have postulated a cognitive module, referred to as a 'social module', whose 
function is to build representations of other people. A social module which is 
responsible for representing other people is carrying out more than simple 
metarepresentation, but is also building representations of non-representative social 
matter. 
If a social intelligence module exists which is responsible for a number of 
information processing tasks, then it is reasonable to expect that there would be 
examples of damage to this module, which would result in a very wide-ranging ( and 
potentially crippling) loss of social ability. The only disorder which causes such 
widespread loss of social function, although sometimes completely sparing nonsocial 
functions, is autism (Davison and Neale, 1990). Baron-Cohen (1995) claims that theory 
of mind deficit is the cause of autism, whereas Kanner (1943) asserted that the primary 
deficit was affective. Without further empirical investigation it can only be said that the 
deficit evident in autism is a social intelligence deficit, but that it remains to be seen 
whether a social intelligence module is in fact another name for a theory of mind 
module, or is a neurological mechanism with a greater range of functions. 
Theory theory versus simulation theory. 
The remaining two accounts of the mechanism through which the understanding 
of psychological states develops are the two most influential and polar positions in the 
literature, so they are discussed together here. "Theory theory" (Gopnik, 1993; Gopnik 
& Astington, 1988; Wellman, 1990) describes the child's understanding of 
psychological states in terms of an implicit theory, analogous to a scientific theory, 
which builds in complexity over time. "Simulation theory" (Goldman, 1989, 1992; 
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Gordon, 1986, 1992; Harris, 1989, 1991; Johnson, 1988) states that the child 'simulates' 
an intuitive model of their own psychological states in order to understand the 
psychological states of others. The relative merits of theory theory and simulation 
theory are discussed below. 
The term 'theory of mind' was coined by Premack and Woodruff (1978) in 
conjunction with their studies regarding the chimpanzee's understanding of mind. 
Premack and Woodruff defined the theory of mind as follows: "In saying that an 
individual has a theory of mind, we mean that the individual imputes mental states to 
[self] and to others (either to conspecifics or to other species as well). A system of 
inferences of this kind is properly viewed as a theory, first, because such states are not 
directly observable, and second, because the system can be used to make predictions, 
specifically about the behaviour of other organisms." ( op.cit., p.515). 
Gopnik and Wellman (1992) claim that children use an implicit, organised causal-
explanatory system with the defining characteristics of theories to explain both their 
own psychological states, and the psychological states of others. The "coherent body of 
abstract theoretical constructs" which the child develops is best described as a theory 
because its primary function is to propose an explanation for the observed behaviour of 
self and others (Wellman, 1990). 
An important division between the theory theory and the simulation theory is the 
matter of the priority of self knowledge (as opposed to knowledge of others). The 
matter of developmental priority of self knowledge has been confused with the 
distinction between theory theory and simulation theory, although it is possible to 
separate the two issues to some extent. Theory theorists such as Moses and Chandler 
(1992), and Gopnik (1993) claim that the child's mentalistic concepts are not acquired 
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for self and then later applied to others, but are constructed as part of a general theory of 
mind which is equally applied to self and other. However, it is possible that young 
children develop a theory of mind, but that knowledge of one's own psychological 
states has developmental priority over knowledge of others (see part three of the 
introduction for a full description of this position, which is called "first-person theory 
theory"). 
Simulation theory states that, rather than theorising about one's own 
psychological states, the child has an automatic, phenomenal knowledge of their own 
states, and that simulating this self knowledge allows the child to understand the 
behaviour and psychological states of others (Goldman 1989, 1992; Gordon 1986, 1992; 
Harris 1989, 1991, and Johnson 1988). The child simply imagines themselves to be in 
the place of the observed other, and by considering the output of their own mind the 
mental states and resultant behaviours of others can be predicted (Gopnik & Wellman, 
1992; Harris, 1991; Johnson, 1988). 
Theory theory proposes a "causal explanatory framework" of theoretical 
constructs such as belief or desire which develops as the child matures, incorporating 
constructs of greater complexity (Fodor, 1992; Lillard & Flavell, 1992; Moses & 
Chandler, 1992; Wellman, 1990; Wellman & Bartsch, 1988). The child's intuitive 
understanding of their own psychological states, which is asserted by simulation 
theorists, is irreconcilable with the concept of a gradually developing causal explanatory 
framework. If simulation theory is true, then the child should be able to recognise any 
psychological state in others that they have personally experienced. The simulation 
theory does not allow for a gradually developing understanding of one's own 
psychological states. Young children refer to only some mental states in their 
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explanations, they refer to different mental states at different stages of their 
development, and their understanding of false belief changes in parallel with their 
understanding of other psychological phenomena (Gopnik and Wellman, 1992). In 
response, Harris (1991) has proposed a version of simulation theory which states that 
the child's access to some of their own psychological states may develop before others. 
For example, a young three-year-old may have a personal model of desire and 
perception, but not belief. Harris' ( 1991) proposal weakens the distinction between 
simulation theory and theory theory, although simulation theory can still be empirically 
distinguished from theory theory by the claim that the young child's inability to 
understand the psychological states of others is due to a deficit of counterfactual 
reasoning ability, which is described below. 
If simulation theory is true, then children should be able to report their own 
mental states with greater accuracy than those of other people. This is apparently not 
the case. Young children do not appear to exhibit the knowledge of their own 
psychological states which simulation theory predicts that they should have. For 
example, three-year-old children often have difficulty reporting their former false beliefs 
(Gopnik and Astington, 1988) or desires (Gopnik and Slaughter, 1989), they are 
unaware of their own learning (Taylor, Esbensen, and Bennett, 1994), and they cannot 
identify the source of their own knowledge or beliefs (Gopnik and Graf, 1988; Povinelli 
and deBlois, 1992). 
Gopnik and Slaughter (1991) found that three-year-old children are in fact quite 
capable of reporting their current psychological states, although incapable of reporting 
past psychological states. It is conceivable that children can give reports of their current 
mental states without any understanding of Intentionality, reporting instead what they 
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perceive to be the objective state of the world. However, three-year-olds are able to 
correctly report a current pretence, which is not a reading of the world 'as it is' (Harris, 
1993), and are aware that thinking is not a transparent representation of current reality. 
For example, three-year-olds understand that a boy who is thinking about a dog may not 
see or touch the dog (Wellman and Estes, 1986). 
The theory theory account of three-year-old children's failure on the false belief 
and representational change tasks is that the child's theory of mind is not adequately 
developed, and does not include an appreciation of belief (Gopnik, 1993). Harris 
(1993), however, suggests that those children who fail the false belief task are not doing 
so because they lack an appreciation of belief, but because they are using the simulation 
process inaccurately - the simulation is going wrong because current first-hand 
experience of the situation is not "overwritten". This first-hand experience is the child's 
"default setting", and each adjustment of the default setting requires a step of 
counterfactual ("what if') reasoning. The more counterfactual steps that are required to 
simulate a psychological state, the harder the simulation will be to execute (Hal'.ris, 
1991 ). For example, understanding one's own current belief requires no counterfactual 
reasoning and should therefore always be possible. To imagine (simulate) the belief of 
another person (or one's own remembered self) requires one counterfactual step. To 
simulate the false belief of another person requires two counterfactual steps. 
Harris (1991, 1993) suggests that a deficit of counterfactual reasoning, which 
leads to a constant inability to see beyond the "default setting" of present reality, is the 
key problem in young children and individuals with autism who fail the false belief and 
representational change tasks. There may be some evidence, in the rigid, stereotyped 
behaviour of some autistic individuals, for the claim that the ability to understand other 
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minds is reliant upon the power to temporarily alter such "default settings"; flexible 
planning requires a lot of counterfactual reasoning. Pemer, Baker, and Hutton (1994) 
regard children's ability to pretend as demonstrating an impressive ability to understand 
counterfactuals. Autistic children are frequently unable to pretend-play or understand 
pretence (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Baron-Cohen & Bolton, 1993). 
Spontaneous pretence can be seen in normal children as early as twelve months, 
and by three or four years many children create elaborate fantasies involving imaginary 
people and animals (Singer & Singer, 1990; Taylor, Cartwright, & Carlson, 1993). If 
even very young children are capable of the counterfactual reasoning required for 
pretence, then a counterfactual reasoning deficit cannot be the cause of their failure on 
false belief and representational change tasks. Harris concedes that if very young 
children were capable of pretence which required the same degree of counterfactual 
ability as the false belief and representational change tasks, then a counterfactual deficit 
could not account for the children's inability to succeed on those tasks. Children's 
pretence, however, undergoes a process of elaboration between 12 and 48 months of 
age, and Harris claims that the level of counterfactual ability required to pass a false 
belief or representational change test is not evident in children's pretence until they are 
of the approximate age that children tend to be able to pass those tests (Harris, 1991 ). 
Evidence regarding Harris' claims could be acquired by observing young children and 
children with autism (who have failed false belief and representational change tasks) to 
see whether they can evidence the ability to do counterfactual reasoning without using 
mentalistic concepts. For example, researchers could observe the children's play, and 
see if objects are ever substituted for imaginary things (e.g. a rock 'becomes' a 
spaceship). If the subjects evidence counterfactual reasoning, then a counterfactual 
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reasoning deficit could not be the cause of their previous false belief/ representational 
change failure, and Harris' claim would be proven false. 
No matter what difficulties young children have in understanding the 
psychological states of others, simulation theory presupposes that children should not be 
systematically wrong about their own psychological states (Gopnik and Wellman, 
1992). Gopnik and Wellman claim that the evidence presented is therefore 
incompatible with simulation theory. Harris (1991) criticises the conclusions of Gopnik 
and Wellman (1992) on the grounds that it is just as hard to simulate one's own past 
false beliefs as it is to simulate the current false beliefs of another person (see part three 
of the discussion). 
Empirical studies (Gopnik and Wellman, 1992) have shown that three-year-old 
children have a well-developed understanding of psychological states such as desires 
and perceptions, but not beliefs. Young children can report desires and perceptions that 
are just immediately past. The poor performance for beliefs therefore cannot be simply 
a problem of poor memory or lost access. These results appear to contradict the 
simulation theory, because the child should either be able or unable to model their own 
psychological states: not able to model some states and not others. The evidence 
appears to present a paradox for simulation theory: If reporting immediately past states 
requires simulation, then three-year-olds are able to simulate their past desires or 
perceptions, but not their past beliefs (which rules out a simple deficit of counterfactual 
reasoning ability). Ifreporting past states does not require simulation, because the states 
are just 'read off the child's internal model, then the three-year-olds should not have 
the the trouble they do simply 'reading off their past beliefs (Gopnik and Wellman, 
1992, p.163). 
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In summary, the central issue when comparing the theory theory and simulation 
theory is the developmental status of self-knowledge. Theory theory claims that the 
child (and therefore, the adult) has no 'privileged access' to the nature of their own 
psychological states, while simulation theory claims that first-person phenomenological 
experience provides an intuitive understanding of one's own psychological states. As is 
stated by Gopnik and Wellman (1992), the issue is an empirical one, and it is the aim of 
the present study to contribute to the empirical investigation of this issue. 
To summarise, part one discussed the evidence from autism for the existence of a 
neurological substrate of the ability to understand psychological states. The evidence 
strongly suggests the existence of a neurological module which is damaged in autistic 
individuals. I then compared and discussed four candidates for the specific function of 
that module: the metarepresentation module, social intelligence module, simulation 
module, and theory of mind module. Leekam and Perner ( 1991) demonstrated that 
young children are capable of representing non-mental representations, which ruled out 
a module responsible for all metarepresentation processing. It is possible that a module 
which processes only mental metarepresentation information exists in the human brain. 
The social intelligence module described by Happe and Frith (1992) appears to be 
nothing more than a theory of mind module by another name. Empirical evidence 
supports the possibilities of both a simulation module and a theory of mind module, 
depending upon the interpretation of that evidence. Simulation theory and theory theory 
can be distinguished empirically, and further testing is required to find results which 
will eliminate one of the two candidates. Part three of the introduction raises the 
possibility of the existence of a "first-person theory of mind module" which 
incorporates elements of the theory of mind module and the simulation module. 
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PART TWO: DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEORY OF MIND 
I will discuss the development of the child's theory of mind in three sections. The 
first section is concerned with the first three years of the child's life, the second section 
describes the theory of mind at three years of age, and the final section considers the 
understanding that older children have of psychological states. 
The first three years. 
Children with autism and certain animals are not the only beings that seem to lack 
understanding of mental states. Very young children also lack this understanding 
(Gopnik and Astington, 1988; Wellman, 1990; Wimmer and Hartl, 1991). 
Developmental evidence supports the view that the child's comprehension of intentional 
states in themselves and others develops over the first years of the child's life, and that 
increasingly complex concepts such as belief and false belief are among the last to be 
included in the child's repertoire (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Chandler and Hala, 1994; Fodor, 
1992; Gopnik, 1993; Gopnik and Astington, 1988; Harris, 1993). In this section I will 
discuss infants' early social referencing and joint attention abilities, and their 
understanding of phenomena such as desire and pretence. 
Intentional communication, joint attention, and social referencing. 
The rapid development of social cognitive ability in the first three years of the 
child's life is comparable to early linguistic development (Wellman, 1993). Just as 
researchers have investigated the possible existence of neural mechanisms which 
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facilitate linguistic development, the existence of a theory of mind module or equivalent 
neural mechanism is often posited to explain the rapid development of the infant's 
understanding of perceptual and mental states (Fodor, 1987; Hobson, 1991; Leslie, 
1987). Children with autism usually fail to develop joint attention behaviours (Baron-
Cohen, 1989; Sigman et al. 1986). Baron-Cohen (1995) describes the infant's early 
development of social referencing and joint attention skills as early steps in the 
development of a theory of mind. 
Theory of mind development may begin with the newborn infant's natural ability 
to imitate the facial expressions of other people. The ability to imitate facial 
expressions provides a basis for social cognition because it allows the infant to 
immediately understand the correspondence between themselves and other people 
(Meltzoff and Gopnik, 1993). 
As the infant matures, social cognitive skills develop which demonstrate some 
degree of Intentionality. Intentionality is a property of all mental states; that they refer 
to some content (Gopnik, 1993). For example, thoughts are intentional mental states 
because one cannot have a thought without having a thought about something. After 
approximately nine months of age intentional abilities such as social referencing, joint 
attention, and imitation of novel actions begin to appear (Adamson & Bakeman, 1985; 
Bakeman & Adamson, 1984; Bates, 1979; Bretherton, Bates, McNew, Shore, 
Williamson, & Beeghly-Smith, 1981; Lempers, Flavell, & Flavell, 1977; Stern, 1985; 
Trevarthen & Hubley, 1978). Joint attention is the ability to follow another person's 
gaze in order to see what they are looking at, and social referencing is the ability of the 
infant to monitor the caregiver' s facial expression in order to understand how to react to 
a novel event (Baron-Cohen, 1991). Social referencing and joint attention abilities are 
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often considered precursors of theory of mind in humans or evidence for the existence 
of a theory of mind in some animals (Baron-Cohen, 1991; Baron-Cohen, 1995; Cheney 
& Seyfarth, 1991; Cheney & Seyfarth, 1992). Social referencing and joint attention 
skills evidence some degree of psychological state understanding because they refer to 
the behavioural consequences of psychological states, such as looking or moving. 
Although the infant probably does not explicitly understand anything of psychological 
states, they are effectively taking psychological states into account in their limited 
understanding of the behavioural consequences of those states. 
At twelve months infants will modify their behaviour in response to their mother's 
emotional reaction (Baldwin, Moses, and Tidball, 1995; Feiring, Lewis, & Starr, 1984; 
Walden and Ogan, 1988). Joint attention is present in infants between eleven and 
fourteen months of age (Scaife and Bruner, 1975). By fourteen months the child is 
capable of producing and comprehending communicative gestures, such as pointing at a 
desired toy (Lempers, Flavell, & Flavell, 1977; Leung and Rheingold, 1981 ; Murphy, 
1978), and infants of this age will check to see that the person to whom they are 
attempting to communicate has followed their point (Bretherton et al. 1981 ). 
Bretherton (1991) claims that infant's early communicative skills take into 
account the intentional nature of other people. For example, fourteen month old infants 
will produce communicative gestures, and if these are not responded to by a partner the 
infant will often reproduce the gesture, possibly increasing its intensity (Bates, 1979). 
Bretherton (1991) argues that preverbal 'intentional communication' is evidence that 
infants attribute mental states to themselves and others, and that the infants understand 
that the behaviour of others can be influenced by signals. 
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Other theorists (Baldwin & Moses, 1994; Butterworth, 1991; Dennett, 1987; 
Perner, 1991) have suggested that it is possible for intentional action to be undertaken 
without the intentional agent having any understanding of their own intentional states. 
In the same manner that preverbal infants may attempt 'intentional communication' 
without an actual understanding of their own intentional states, they may also 
understand the responsive nature of communicative partners in a behaviourist fashion 
(Golinkoff, Harding, Carlson, & Sexton, 1984). As is the case with joint attention and 
social referencing skills, any infant that understands the behavioural consequences of 
psychological states should be considered to have at least a basic, implicit understanding 
of those states. 
Desire. 
Before young children develop an understanding of the representational nature of 
belief or false belief, they first develop an understanding of desire (Lillard & Flavell, 
1992). Bartsch and Wellman (1995) demonstrated that even two year olds understand 
that people can differ in their desires and that the same object can be desirable to one 
person and undesirable to another. By two years of age children refer to their own 
mental states and those of others while talking about their own desires (Bartsch and 
Wellman, 1989, 1995). 
Searle (1984) draws a distinction between psychological states with a "world to 
mind" direction of fit ( e.g. desire) and a "mind to world" direction of fit ( e.g. belief). 
Desire has a "world to mind" fit because the world changes to fit the mind/desire. 
Belief has a "mind to world" fit because the mind/belief changes to fit the world. 
Psychological states with a "world to mind" direction of fit may be easier to understand 
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because the physical world must be understood to change in response to the state, but 
there is no need for the child to understand that a psychological state might change to 
correspond with the physical world (Johnson, 1988; Perner, 1991). Young children 
may find desire easier to understand than belief because there is no possibility of 
misrepresentation in desire; there is no concept of "false desire" for the child to 
understand (Perner, 1991). 
Astington and Gopnik (1991) claim that children initially have a mentalistic, but 
non-representational, theory of mind. Children with a mentalistic, non-representational 
theory of mind would only have an understanding of psychological states with a world 
to mind fit, such as desire. All mind to world fit psychological states represent the 
world in a particular way, and can change to 'fit' the world. Children's initial 
development of such a mentalistic, non-representational theory would explain the 
child's development of an understanding of desire and intention before belief, because 
children would understand the non-representational world to mind fit aspects of mental 
states before the representational ones. A contributing factor, or even an alternative 
explanation, is that desire may be understood at an earlier age due to the relatively high 
intensity of phenomenological experience which often accompanies it (Pillow, 1988). 
Pretence. 
Infants as young as twelve months often demonstrate examples of spontaneous 
pretence, and by three or four years of age many children frequently engage in elaborate 
pretence (Singer & Singer, 1990; Taylor, Cartwright, & Carlson, 1993). At two years of 
age children can understand, and act in accordance with the pretences of others (Harris 
& Kavanaugh, 1993; Harris, Kavanaugh, & Meredith, 1994). The capacity for pretend-
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play may be evidence of metarepresentation and counterfactual reasoning abilities in 
young infants, which suggests that pretence is conceptually related to the later 
development of the child's understanding of belief and false belief (Harris, 1991; Leslie, 
1987, 1988). Fodor (1992) claims that some understanding of false belief is necessary 
for pretence, but Harris (1991) argues that only a certain degree of counterfactual 
reasoning ability is required. Regardless of whether any understanding of false belief is 
necessary for pretence, the apparent necessity of counterfactual reasoning suggests that 
pretence may be an important stepping-stone on the child's path toward a fully 
developed understanding of psychological states. 
Lillard (1994) claims that many activities which researchers often consider to be 
pretend play (e.g. jumping 'like a kangaroo') do not require pretence, but are 
understood by the child as a simple social activity. While very young children have 
been demonstrated as being capable of pretence (e.g. Singer & Singer, 1990), most 
four-year-olds (and many five year olds) tend to define pretence in behavioural terms; 
that a person is pretending when they are acting appropriately ( e.g. jumping like a 
kangaroo), even if the person is not thinking about the object of pretence (in this case, 
kangaroos). If young children understand pretence in behavioural terms only, then the 
child's understanding of pretence does not provide evidence for an early understanding 
of intentional or representational states. 
To summarise, during the first three years of the child's life, skills develop which 
appear to provide the basis for the later development of an understanding of 
psychological states. Joint attention and social referencing behaviours may represent 
the beginnings of the development of a theory of mind (Baron-Cohen, 1991; Baron-
Cohen, 1995). The child's understanding of desire and pretence which develops during 
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the second and third years is often described by theory theorists as an early theory of 
mind, or causal explanatory framework, which will later incorporate representational 
concepts such as belief and intention (Gopnik and Wellman, 1994). The three-year-old 
child, who begins to evidence some understanding of representational states such as 
belief, is discussed in the next section. 
The three-year-old child. 
Three-year-olds already prefer mentalistic descriptions of events to behaviourist 
ones (Lillard and Flavell, 1990) and talk about mental states (Bartsch and Wellman, 
1995; Shatz, Wellman, and Silber, 1983). In this section I will discuss evidence for the 
development of three-year-olds' understanding of belief and false belief, perspective 
taking, knowledge, and intention. 
Belief and false belief 
Most research in the theory of mind literature is concerned with the acquisition of 
the child's concept of false belief (e.g. Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith, 1985; Bartsch 
and Wellman, 1989; Chandler and Hala, 1994; Dunn, 1991; Dunn and Munn, 1985; 
Gopnik, 1993; Gopnik and Astington, 1988; Leslie, 1987; Lewis, 1994; Perner, 
Leekam, and Wimmer, 1987; Reddy, 1991; Siegal and Beattie, 1990; Wellman, 1990; 
Wimmer and Perner, 1983; Zaitchik, 1991). The general consensus is that at three years 
of age most children fail false belief and representational change tests, but mastery will 
be reached by five years of age. In the false belief test, the child witnesses a scenario in 
which a character will have a false belief about a particular situation ( e.g. the location of 
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an object) and the child is then asked what the character believes. In order to pass the 
test, the child must state what the character's false belief is. In the representational 
change test, the child is put in a situation in which their own psychological state (such as 
a belief) changes, and the child is then asked what their original state was. In order to 
pass the test, the child must successfully report the original state. Gopnik (1993) and 
Wellman (1990) claim that a child that does not understand that beliefs can be false does 
not have a full understanding of belief. In part four of the introduction I will discuss the 
conceptual justification of the false belief and representational change tasks in the 
present study. 
There are two major versions of the false belief task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & 
Frith, 1985; Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). In the 
"unexpected location" task, a child witnesses an object being placed in a particular 
location by a puppet, who then leaves the area. Then the object is moved (hidden), and 
the puppet returns. The child is asked where the puppet will search for the object. In 
order to succeed on the task, the child must take the puppet's false belief into account 
and answer that the puppet will search in the object's old location (where the puppet 
'thinks' it is). The "unexpected contents" task involves a familiar container being 
presented to the child, which is then shown to have unexpected contents. Most three-
year-old children predict that another person would think that the unexpected contents 
are in the container, and thus fail to demonstrate an understanding of false belief in 
others (Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987). 
The representational change task (Freeman & Lacohee, 1995; Gopnik & 
Astington, 1988; Wimmer & Hartl, 1991) is designed to demonstrate a child's ability 
( or inability) to understand that beliefs can not only be false, but that they can change. 
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Gopnik and Astington (1988) showed young children (three, four, and five years) a 
deceptive object and asked each child what they thought the object was when they first 
saw it. The children found the false belief task easier to pass than the representational 
change task, and the ability to succeed on the representational change task appeared to 
develop at approximately four years of age. 
Three-year-olds rarely succeed on the false belief task, and mastery is usually 
reached by five years of age (Wimmer and Pemer, 1983). The results of false belief 
studies have been replicated many times (Moses and Chandler, 1992). Theorists 
(Chandler, 1988; Gopnik and Wellman, 1994; Harris, 1991, 1993; Wellman, 1990) 
frequently debate claims that there is a developmental 'shift' to a representational theory 
of mind at three years of age, which allows four year olds to pass the false belief test 
which three-year-olds cannot. 
Evidence is accumulating, however, that children who fail the standard false belief 
task do not do so necessarily because of a lack of understanding of false belief ( e.g. 
Siegal & Beattie, 1991). For example, three-year-olds show improved performance on 
false belief tasks if the salience of the true state of affairs is reduced (Zaitchik, 1991 ). 
Performance is also enhanced if children are helped with the memory requirements of 
the task (Mitchell & Lacohee, 1991) and if the experimenter goes over the sequence of 
events in the false belief story twice before asking the test question (Lewis, 1994). 
Chandler and Hala (1994) showed that personal involvement of the child in setting up 
the "scene" in the false belief task also enhances performance. 
Although the standard false belief task reveals the difficulties three-year-old 
children have in predicting behaviour based on false belief, three-year-olds are able to 
explain behaviours in terms of false belief after the event (Bartsch & Wellman, 1989; 
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Wellman, 1990). Children as young as two years spontaneously carry out deceptive acts 
and seem to be aware of the false beliefs their acts cause in others ( e.g. Dunn, 1991; 
Dunn & Munn, 1985; Reddy, 1991). The evidence described above may challenge the 
concept of a 'watershed age' in theory of mind development or a 'developmental shift', 
but it is also possible that there is a developmental shift to a representational theory of 
mind, and that the evidence only lowers the age at which the shift is thought to occur. 
Theory of mind researchers disagree as to whether the three-year-old child has a 
concept of representation. Woolley and Wellman (1993) have proposed that three-year-
olds have some understanding of representational mental states, but that they often 
confuse the extent to which such states represent the physical world and state that 
imaginary representations truthfully reflect reality. Perner (1988, 1991) argues that 
three-year-old children are 'situation theorists' who have a non-representational 
understanding of the relationships between people and the world, and that four-year-old 
children become 'meta representers' (i.e. four-year-old children have a representational 
theory of mind). Other theorists (Astington & Gopnik, 1991; Flavell, 1988; Forguson & 
Gopnik, 1988) also consider the three-year-old child to have a non-representational 
theory of mind. Astington and Gopnik (1991) describe the three-year-old's theory of 
mind as mentalistic, but non-representational. Wellman (1990; and see Chandler, 1988, 
for a similar view) claims that three-year-olds do have a concept of representation, but 
that they have yet to develop an interpretivist understanding. An interpretivist 
understanding of the representational nature of mental states includes the notion of a 
mind which actively mediates and distorts the perception of reality. It is not clear 
whether there can yet be any resolution of the 'developmental shift' issue. Although it 
is an empirical question whether there is a developmental shift from a non-
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representational to representational understanding of psychological states, the larger 
issue is not so easily resolved. The larger issue is whether the proposed developmental 
shift from non-representational to representational understanding is singularly 
important, or if it is only one in a series of important developmental milestones, such as 
the early development of joint attention and social referencing skills. 
Perspective taking and knowledge. 
By three years of age children are usually able to understand and report what other 
people can and cannot see from a particular physical vantage point, which has been 
labelled "level 1 perspective taking". Three-year-old children have difficulties, 
however, in understanding how something looks to another person, which is called 
"level 2 perspective taking" (Flavell, 1978; Lempers, Flavell, & Flavell, 1977; 
Masangkay, McKloskey, Sims-Knight, Vaughn, & Flavell, 1974). Gopnik, Slaughter, 
and Meltzoff (1994) have demonstrated that three-year-olds understand perceptual 
misrepresentation better than false belief. Gopnik et al. claim that mental 
representations are causally related to world events (a "mind to world" direction of fit), 
and that children first learn this in the context of perception. 
Wellman and Bartsch (1988) claim that three-year-olds can appropriately infer the 
presence or absence of belief given information as to a character's seeing or not seeing a 
relevant situation. Three-year-olds do however appear to have difficulties explaining 
what other people do or do not know by making reference to perceptual access (Perner 
& Ogden, 1988; Taylor, 1988). Most three-year-olds and some four-year-olds cannot 
reliably assess whether another person knows what is in a box as a function of whether 
the person has looked inside (Pillow, 1989; Pratt & Bryant, 1990; Ruffman & Olson, 
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1989; Wimmer, Hogrefe, & Perner, 1988; Woolley, 1991). Three-year-old children 
also have difficulties identifying the source of their knowledge (Gopnik & Graf, 1988), 
the types of knowledge which can be acquired through particular sensory modalities 
(O'Neill, Astington, & Flavell, 1992; O'Neill & Gopnik, 1991), and the amount of time 
elapsed since knowledge was acquired. Four and five year old children will still claim 
that they have always known novel inf01mation which had just been taught to them by 
an experimenter (Taylor, Esbensen, and Bennett, 1994). Wimmer, Hogrefe, and Sodian 
(1988) have tried to account for these difficulties by proposing that there are two stages 
in the development of the child's theory of mind. The first stage begins in the second 
year of the child's life, in which children first become aware of thoughts and desires as 
mental states. The second stage, which begins to become evident in five year old 
children, is characterised by the child's ability to understand the informational origins of 
their knowledge. Wimmer et al. claim that the ability to understand the sources of one's 
knowledge is intrinsic to the child's ability to understand how they might come to hold 
a false belief. 
Intention. 
Two year old children often use language which suggests an understanding of 
intention or goal-directed behaviour (Dunn, 1991; Frye, 1991; Piaget, 1952; Willats, 
1984). An example of such language might be; "Sarah is going to (i.e. intends to) run 
away". The term 'intention' should not be confused with Intentionality, which refers to 
a property of all mental states (that is, that they refer to or represent an external content). 
Moses (1993) claims that intention and belief are co-dependent to the degree that 
it is difficult to imagine an intention existing without a related belief, and that intention 
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therefore could not be fully understood by children before they understand belief. 
Moses found that three-year-old children could accurately report a person's unfulfilled 
intentions and showed considerable understanding of that person's accompanying false 
beliefs. Wellman and Bartsch (1988) claim that even young three-year-olds understand 
that information about beliefs is a necessary addition to information about desires to 
explain or predict actions, and can predict the appropriate emotional reaction to the 
outcomes of belief-desire caused actions. Evidence from these investigations 
contradicts the view held by Perner (1991): that three-year-old children have a non-
representational understanding of intention. Evidence from the child's understanding 
of belief (e.g. Chandler & Hala, 1994) which appears to push back the age at which 
young children understand the intentional or representational nature of mental states, 
also reduces the credibility of arguments that there is a watershed age before which 
children do not understand representation at all (e.g. Flavell et al., 1993). Instead, the 
child appears to develop an increasingly complex repertoire of explanatory constructs 
( sometimes called a causal explanatory network or reasoning scheme) such as desire, 
perception, and belief, which is used to explain the behaviour of intentional agents, such 
as humans. 
In summary, attempts to describe a 'watershed' period of theory of mind 
development tend to focus upon three and four-year-old children (e.g. Gopnik, 1993; 
Perner, 1991). One of the more common 'developmental shifts' described by theorists 
such as Perner and Gopnik is the point at which the young child is said to acquire a 
representational theory of mind. The "false belief watershed" (the point at which the 
young child develops an understanding of false belief) is a developmental milestone 
which is being attributed to younger and younger children (Bartsch & Wellman, 1989; 
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Chandler & Hala, 1994; Dunn, 1991; Dunn & Munn, 1985; Reddy, 1991; Wellman, 
1990). Theorists such as Chandler and Hala (1994) who "chase" the earliest point at 
which the child evidences a representational theory of mind may be missing the point, 
that the development of the theory of mind is characterised by a succession of 
milestones - new skills that, no matter how simple, pave the way for an adult 
understanding of psychological states. 
The evidence discussed in this section tends to support the view that there is no 
specific developmental period or 'watershed' at which the child develops a 
representational theory of mind. Early joint attention and social referencing behaviours, 
and a later understanding of desire and pretence may be early developments of a theory 
of mind which is gradually constructed, without any sudden 'developmental shift'. The 
ability of three-year-old children to comprehend intention, which is arguably dependent 
upon belief (Moses, 1993), is another point against the concept of three-year-old 
children who do not understand the representational nature of psychological states. 
Theorists such as Freeman and Lacohee (1995) and Lillard and Flavell (1992) describe 
the development of the child's theory of mind as a continuous process of constructing 
and perfecting explanatory devices to understand human behaviour. The process of 
theory of mind development does not stop at age three (Wellman, 1990), and the further 
developments are discussed in the next section. 
Later development. 
The child's understanding of the representational nature of belief and false belief 
which begins to become apparent in three-year-old children, may be a necessary 
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precursor to later understanding of the mind as an entity which mediates and distorts the 
perception of reality (Flavell et al., 1993; Wellman, 1990). 
Before six years of age, the child is apparently unable to understand that another 
person who shares their perceptual perspective may not be able to identify an object if 
the other person does not have the same prior knowledge of the object (Taylor, 1988). 
Taylor interpreted her results as supporting Chandler and Boyes' (1982) position that 
young children have a 'copy theory of mind'. A copy theory of mind is one in which 
the child conceives of the mind as a passive recorder or copier of incoming information 
(Chandler & Boyes, 1982; Flavell, 1988; Wellman, 1988). Other theorists disagree with 
Taylor's interpretation of the data, claiming instead that many three-year-old children 
and most four-year-olds demonstrate an understanding of the mind as an active 
information processor (Flavell, 1988; Perner & Davies, 1991). 
Even eight year olds have difficulty understanding that the mind influences what 
one can know from verbal messages. For example, eight year old children think that a 
preverbal baby will understand a message spoken by an adult (Montgomery, 1991, 
1992; Taylor, Cartwright, & Bowden, 1991). At approximately age six children begin 
to understand the sources of their knowledge (O'Neill & Gopnik, 1991), and that 
knowledge can be arrived at by inference (Flavell et al., 1993). Pillow (1991) 
demonstrated that at approximately six years of age children are capable of 
understanding that people can have a biased interpretation of another person's 
behaviour. 
Wellman (1990) claims that after six years of age, the child's theory of mind 
develops in two important ways; the development of specific theories and natural 
epistemology. Specific theories are part of the greater 'theory of mind framework', and 
44 
are used to explain such phenomena as the self, intelligence, and memory. For example, 
the developing self theory is a constructed understanding of one's own " .. beliefs, 
desires, traits, history of perceptions, and memories" (Wellman, 1990, p.298). The 
child's understanding of the nature of intelligence appears to develop after age six 
(Dweck & Bempechat, 1983; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Sternberg, Conway, Ketron, and 
Bernstein, 1981; Yussen & Kane, 1985), as does their understanding of memory (Beal, 
1985; Fabricius & Wellman, 1983; Flavell, 1971; Flavell & Wellman, 1977; Gordon & 
Flavell, 1977; Herrmann, 1982; Johnson & Wellman, 1982; Kreutzer, Leonard, & 
Flavell, 1975; Schneider, 1985; Wellman, 1983). Wellman (1990) claims that after age 
six children develop a 'constructivist epistemology', as opposed to an absolutist or 
objectivist epistemology. An objectivist epistemology describes the world as being one 
way; that there is a single, objective truth of every matter. A constructivist 
epistemology describes truth as relative, that " ... persons may find legitimately different 
meanings in what are ostensibly the same facts" (Chandler, 1987, p.135). 
Development of the child's understanding of intention, pretence, desire, belief, 
and other concepts described earlier does not appear to stop after four or five years of 
age. Wellman (1990) describes the later development of these concepts as a process of 
elaboration and consolidation. After six years of age children become increasingly 
adept at second order thinking; the ability to think about thoughts about thoughts 
(Miller, Kessel, & Flavell, 1970; Perner & Wimmer, 1985). The developing capacity 
for second order thinking can also be described as an increase in the capacity for the 
metarepresentation of mental representations. Older children are also capable of 
increasingly sophisticated discussion about appearance-reality phenomena (that what an 
object appears to be may not be what it actually is) and the phenomenon of 
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misinterpretation in visual representations (Flavell et al., 1986). After six years of age 
children begin to demonstrate an explicit understanding that the mind may be defined in 
terms of mental states (psychology), while the brain is the subject of biology - defined 
as it is in terms of neurological states (Johnson & Wellman, 1982). Once the child has 
come to understand that a distinction may be made between the mind and brain, they 
may begin a life-long period of attempting to develop an understanding of how to 
reintegrate the two. 
To summarise part two of the introduction, the first three years of the child's life 
are filled with the development of skills which, in themselves, do not appear to evidence 
explicit understanding of psychological states, but which refer to the behavioural 
consequences of psychological states. Early skills such as joint attention and social 
referencing are important milestones which pave the way for later development of the 
child's theory of mind. At three years of age children begin to evidence an 
understanding of belief, perspective taking, knowledge, and intention. After three years 
of age the child consolidates and elaborates their earlier understanding of psychological 
states, and begins to understand the mind as an active processor of one's perceptions 
rather than a passive receptacle. 
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PART THREE: FIRST-PERSON THEORY THEORY 
Part three is divided into three sections. In the first section I will discuss the 
developmental priority of self knowledge. Gopnik (1993) states the the child's theory 
of mind is applied simultaneously to self and other, while simulation theorists such as 
Harris (1991) claim that people have a direct, phenomenological understanding of their 
own psychological states which is superior to their understanding of other people's 
psychological states. Self knowledge is a crucial issue in distinguishing empirically 
between theory theory and simulation theory. 
In the second section I will propose a role for psychological experience in theory 
of mind development. Gopnik (1993) is careful to make the distinction between 
psychological experience ( or the "stream of consciousness") and psychological states, 
but she does not suggest any role that psychological experience might play in theory of 
mind development. 
In the third section I will present my "first-person theory theory". First-person 
theory theory states that the child develops a theory of mind which is first used to 
explain the child's own behaviour, and is only later applied to the behaviour of others. 
First-person theory theory also proposes a role for psychological experience in theory of 
mind development. The issues of developmental priority of self knowledge and whether 
the child's understanding of psychological states is theoretical have become confused in 
the literature ( e.g. Moses & Chandler, 1992). The value of first-person theory theory is 
that it makes clear the distinction between the two issues by demonstrating that it is 
possible that self knowledge could be theorised by the young child, and yet still have 
developmental priority. 
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Self knowledge. 
In this section I will discuss the nature of the child's understanding of their own 
psychological states in relation to their understanding of the psychological states of 
others. Gopnik (1993) draws a distinction between psychological experience and 
psychological states. Psychological experience is described as being the conscious 
experience or phenomenology described by Joyce or Woolfe, the 'stream of 
consciousness' and accompanymg qualia often reported by normal humans. 
Psychological ( or mental) states are described as being the underlying entities that 
explain our behaviour and experience, such as beliefs and desires. Simulation theory 
does not make a distinction between psychological states and psychological experience 
(Gopnik, 1993). 
Flavell, Green, and Flavell (1993) have found that children as old as four years 
tend to say that the mind of a waiting person is "not doing anything", whether that 
person is another individual or themselves, and that a person who wanted to could keep 
his or her "mind completely empty of all thoughts and ideas" for three minutes. 
Although the children in the study by Flavell et al. did not recognise the continuous 
nature of psychological experience (or 'stream of consciousness'), early intentional 
behaviours such as joint attention and social referencing suggest that even very young 
infants have a psychological experience (Flavell et al., 1993). 
Gopnik (1993) claims that although we are aware of our own phenomenological 
experience we do not have a privileged first-person knowledge of our own 
psychological states. Common sense (as described by Gopnik) and simulation theory 
(Goldman, 1989, 1992; Gordon, 1986, 1992; Harris, 1989, 1991; Johnson, 1988) claim 
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that normal humans have a direct, intuitive understanding of the intentional nature of 
their own psychological states. People are said to note the behaviours which result from 
their own ( directly known) psychological states, and when those same behaviours are 
produced by others the inference is made that the other person holds the same 
psychological state. In contrast, Gopnik (1993) explains our understanding of 
intentional states in ourselves and others in terms of the 'theory theory'. The theory 
theory states that the young child develops an implicit theory of mind, which explains 
the nature of the mental states that underlie human behaviour without any particular 
emphasis on one's own mental states. The child's theory of mind allows them no more 
understanding of their own psychological states than of similar states in other people 
(Gopnik, 1993; Gopnik & Wellman, 1992; Moses & Chandler, 1992). 
If, as simulation theory proposes, young children have an intuitive understanding 
of their own psychological states, then the child would be expected to succeed on tasks 
which test that understanding (Gopnik, 1993). On the contrary, Gopnik and Astington 
( 1988) found that one-half to two-thirds of the three-year-olds in their study failed to 
correctly answer questions about their previous false beliefs in an unexpected contents 
task (see p.67 for a description of the task). Gopnik and Astington' s results have been 
replicated several times, and controls for memory and syntactic complexity of the 
questions have ruled out these explanations of the finding (Moore et al., 1990; Wimmer 
& Hartl, 1991 ). Gopnik and Astington also asked the children an additional control 
question, with the same syntactic structure as the test questions, which asked about a 
past physical state rather than a past mental state. Only children who passed this control 
question were included in the experiment. 
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Gopnik (1993) also argues that evidence that young children are unable to identify 
the source of their knowledge (Gopnik & Graf, 1988; O'Neill, Astington, & Flavell, 
1992; O'Neill & Gopnik, 1991; Wimmer et al., 1988) is incongruent with the assertion 
by simulation theorists that children have privileged first-person knowledge of their own 
psychological states. Gopnik and Slaughter (1991) found that when three-year-old 
children were made aware that they were in one state (e.g. hungry) and then another 
(e.g. not hungry), a significant minority (30%-40%) reported that they had been in their 
final state the whole time. Half of a sample of children who were asked to complete a 
task ( e.g. draw a ball with a red crayon) and were then interrupted before they could 
finish and asked to complete a different task ( e.g. change the drawing to an apple) 
reported that they had originally intended to complete the second task. Gopnik (1993) 
claims that young children's difficulties in identifying past intentional states is evidence 
that they do not have an intuitive first-person knowledge of their own psychological 
states. 
Harris (1993) argues against the validity of Gopnik' s conclusions with two points. 
Harris' first criticism is that the evidence only shows that young children have 
difficulties in understanding the intentional nature of their own past beliefs, and that 
simulation theory need not claim that the child's past beliefs are directly accessible to 
first-person knowledge. If counterfactual reasoning is required to simulate the beliefs of 
another person or one's own false or past beliefs, then the young child's inability to 
identify their own past mental states can be explained in terms of a counterfactual 
reasoning (i.e. simulation) deficit. However, children as young as twelve months to two 
years of age demonstrate the capacity for pretence (Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993; Harris, 
Kavanaugh, & Meredith, 1994; Singer & Singer, 1990; Taylor, Cartwright, & Carlson, 
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1993), which appears to present a problem for Harris' claim that a counterfactual 
reasoning deficit is responsible for young children's inability to understand their own 
past false beliefs. 
Harris (1993) cites an experiment by Zaitchik (1991) as evidence that young 
children who have difficulties with the false belief task may do so because of an 
inability to over-ride the default settings of present reality. Zaitchik has shown that 
when three-year-olds are not given first-hand experience of reality (e.g. the relocation of 
an object is described to them, but not actually shown) then their ability to succeed on 
the false belief task improves dramatically. Zaitchik's result, however, can also be 
explained by theory theory: It is quite reasonable to expect that although the child might 
understand false belief, they are simply distracted or confused by the high salience of 
the testing situation. 
In summary, it is not immediately obvious whether theory theory or simulation 
theory provides a better explanation of development of the child's understanding of 
psychological states. Further empirical testing is needed to distinguish the two 
accounts. A third account which incorporates features of both theory theory and 
simulation theory, the "first-person theory theory", is presented in section three. 
The role of psychological experience in theory development. 
In this section I will consider the role of psychological experience m the 
development of the child's understanding of their own psychological states. Gopnik 
(1993), while careful to define the distinction between psychological experience and 
psychological states, does not suggest what role (if any) psychological experience may 
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play in the development of the child's theory of mind. While simulation theory 
suggests a very important role for phenomenology in facilitating the child's 
understanding of psychological states ( allowing a direct, intuitive understanding of 
one's own states), theory theory invariably asserts that the the child has no such intuitive 
first-person knowledge (Gopnik, 1993; Moses & Chandler, 1992), and theory theorists 
do not suggest any role that psychological experience might play. 
It is possible that once the young child becomes reflectively aware of their own 
phenomenological experience they begin to theorise about their own psychological 
states, and that the theories constructed by the child are soon applied to explain the 
behaviour of other people. If the child begins to construct a theory of mind after 
developing some awareness of their own psychological experience and the theory is first 
used to explain the child's own behaviour, then young children should evidence a 
greater understanding of their own psychological states than of the psychological states 
of others. Such a difference between the child's understanding of false belief in self and 
others may not be detectable by standard false belief tasks such as those used by Gopnik 
and Astington (1988). The child may indeed not have an understanding of false belief 
in others, and their understanding of their own false beliefs may only be demonstrable 
when the child has some degree of personal and cognitive involvement in the false 
belief scenario. If the child's awareness of their own psychological experience led them 
to theorise about their own psychological states, then current psychological experience 
may help the child to demonstrate their understanding of a particular psychological 
state. 
Three-year-olds have significantly less difficulty with false belief tasks when the 
child has personal involvement in the deception of an assistant (Chandler & Hala, 
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1994). Chandler and Hala claim that the greater cognitive involvement of the child in 
the task reveals an understanding of false belief in three-year-olds that many theorists 
have previously denied (Flavell, 1988; Forguson & Gopnik, 1988; Leslie, 1988; Perner, 
1988; Wimmer, Hogrefe, & Perner, 1988; Wimmer, Hogrefe, & Sodian, 1988). 
Chandler and Hala's (1994) findings support the present proposal, that heightened 
cognitive involvement highlights a greater understanding of false belief on the child's 
part because it is similar to the awareness of psychological experience which stimulates 
the child's theory of mind development. The second proposal of the present study is 
that heightened cognitive involvement will increase children's accuracy on questions 
about their own psychological states to a greater degree than it will increase accuracy on 
questions about the psychological states of others. Part four of the introduction 
describes the present study in which the two proposals are tested. 
First-person theory theory. 
There is a confusion in the literature (e.g. Moses & Chandler, 1992) between two 
issues. The first issue is whether the child's developing understanding of psychological 
states, both in themselves and others, is theoretical in nature. The second issue is 
whether the child's understanding of their own psychological states develops before 
their understanding of other people's psychological states. Theory theory (e.g. Gopnik, 
1993) proposes that the child's understanding of psychological states is theoretical in 
nature, and that there is no developmental priority of self knowledge. Simulation theory 
( e.g. Harris, 1991) proposes that the child's understanding of psychological states is not 
theoretical in nature, and that self knowledge does have developmental priority. The 
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literature of theory theory and simulation theory tends to assume that all versions of 
theory theory will propose that there is no developmental priority of self knowledge, 
and that only simulation theory proposes that children understand their own 
psychological states before they understand such states in others. First-person theory 
theory is proposed by the present study in order to distinguish between these two issues, 
by describing a version of theory theory in which self knowledge of psychological states 
has developmental priority. 
I have described the two elements which constitute the first-person theory theory 
in sections one and two. The first element of first-person theory theory is that the 
child's theory of mind is initially developed to explain the child's own behaviour, and is 
only later applied to the behaviour of others. The first element of first-person theory 
theory will be tested in the present study. 
The second element of first-person theory theory is the proposed role of 
psychological experience or 'stream of consciousness' in theory of mind development. 
The child begins to theorise about their own psychological states after having first 
become reflectively aware of their own psychological experience. Later reflection upon 
the child's personal psychological experience in a situation which involves a particular 
psychological state will facilitate recall of the theorising process, and will thus enhance 
the child's ability to apply their theoretical understanding of that state to the situation. 
If this account is correct, then heightened cognitive involvement in a false belief or 
representational change test should facilitate the child's accuracy in answering test 
questions about their own beliefs to a greater degree than it would facilitate the child's 
accuracy in answering questions about other people's beliefs. This prediction of the 
first-person theory theory will be tested in the present study. 
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PARTFOUR: THEPRESENTSTUDY 
First-person theory theory states that the young child develops a theory of mind 
which is first used to explain the child's own behaviour in terms of psychological states, 
and is later applied to the behaviour of others. First-person theory theory represents a 
compromise between 'hard' theory theory, which states that the child's theory of mind 
is applied to self and other simultaneously (Gopnik, 1993; Gopnik & Wellman, 1992; 
Moses & Chandler, 1992), and simulation theory, which states that the child has no need 
to develop a theory about anybody's behaviour - they can simply "read" an internal 
model of their own psychological states (Goldman, 1989, 1992; Gordon, 1986, 1992; 
Harris, 1989, 1991; Johnson, 1988). 
The second element of first-person theory theory is the proposed role of awareness 
of personal psychological experience in theory of mind development. First-person 
theory theory states that the child's initial theorising (about their own psychological 
states) begins after they become reflectively aware of their own psychological 
experience or 'stream of consciousness'. If the child's awareness of their own 
psychological experience led them to theorise about their own psychological states, then 
the psychological experience which accompanies heightened cognitive involvement in a 
task (such as a representational change test) should help the child to demonstrate their 
understanding of their own psychological states to a greater degree than it helps them 
understand other people's psychological states. 
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Subjects in the present study were assigned to a participation group, or a non-
participation group, and run through five experimental trials each. Subjects in the 
participation group would help move the props ( e.g. hiding soap) and choose one of 
three props to replace the 'hidden' object with. Subjects in the non-participation group 
simply watched and answered questions. 
Each subject was run through five trials of the experimental procedure, two of 
which were control trials (see method, p.). Each experimental trial consisted of two 
parts. The first part was a false belief test, in which the child was shown two containers 
( e.g. a covered soap dish and an icecream cone box), and one of the containers was 
empty, while the other had an appropriate object inside (in trial A the icecream cone box 
was empty, and the soap dish contained soap). While an assistant was out of the room, 
the contents of the second container were 'hidden' from the assistant in the first 
container. For example, in trial A the soap was put in the icecream cone box and one of 
three coloured balls was put in the soap dish. Subjects in the participation group helped 
the experimenter to hide the object, while non-participation subjects simply watched. 
The child was then asked look questions about where the assistant would look for the 
soap, and think questions about where the assistant would think the soap was. Control 
questions (see method, p.66) were asked at this point. 
Once the assistant had returned and been 'surprised', the child was asked to put 
the hidden object (soap) back in it's original position. Shortly before this point, the 
assistant had used sleight of hand to replace the soap dish which contained a coloured 
ball with an identical one which contained soap. The child was surprised to see the 
(unexpected) soap when they opened the soap dish. The experimenter then asked look 
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questions about where the child had looked for the soap, and think questions about 
where they had thought the soap was. 
The present study investigates five specific questions, all of which are discussed 
below. The first question tests the first proposal of first-person theory theory, that the 
young child understands their own psychological states before they understand the 
psychological states of others. The second question tests the second proposal of first-
person theory theory, that the child's reflection upon their personal psychological 
experience during a false belief test will facilitate recall of the theorising process, and 
will thus enhance the child's ability to understand false belief, particularly their own 
false beliefs. 
Do the subjects respond with greater accuracy to self questions 
or to other questions? 
Gopnik (1993) reports that young children do not answer questions about their 
own false beliefs with any greater accuracy than they answer questions about other 
people's false beliefs, and concludes that the child's theory of mind is applied to self 
and other simultaneously. The present study attempts to replicate the results of Gopnik 
(1993). If subjects in the present study respond with equal accuracy to the self and other 
questions, then the results will be a successful replication of Gopnik's (1993) findings. 
If the present finding is that subjects respond with greater accuracy to the self questions 
than to the other questions, then the theoretical implication is that 'hard' theory theory 
of the type presented by Gopnik (1993) is wrong. The first-person theory theory 
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predicts that subjects will respond with greater accuracy to the self questions than to the 
other questions. 
Do the subjects in the participation group respond to self questions with greater 
accuracy than to other questions? 
The first-person theory theory (presented in part three of the introduction) predicts 
that the subjects in the participation group will respond to the self questions with greater 
accuracy than to the other questions. If the child's awareness of their own 
psychological experience causes them to begin theorising about their own psychological 
states, and the greater cognitive involvement / psychological experience of the 
participation subjects facilitates understanding of those psychological states, then 
subjects in the participation group should have their understanding of their own false 
beliefs facilitated to a greater degree than their understanding of other people's false 
beliefs. 
If the present result is that participation group subjects respond to the self 
questions with greater accuracy than the other questions, then 'hard' theory theory (e.g. 
Gopnik, 1993) will have been shown to be incorrect, as 'hard' theory theory states that 
young children have no greater understanding of their own psychological states than 
they have of other people's psychological states. If the present result is that 
participation group subjects do not respond to the self questions with greater accuracy 
than to the other questions, then the second element of first-person theory theory (that 
awareness of one's own psychological experience initiates self-theorising) will have 
been disproved. 
Do the subjects in the participation group respond to the test questions with 
greater accuracy than those in the non-participation group? 
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Chandler and Hala (1994) report that subjects who have some degree of personal 
involvement in the execution of the experimental task answer test questions with 
significantly greater accuracy than those subjects who have no such involvement. The 
present study attempts to replicate the findings of Chandler and Hala by comparing the 
accuracy of a participation group and a non-participation group. If subjects in the 
participation group respond to the test questions with greater accuracy than those in the 
non-participation group, then the result will be a successful replication of Chandler and 
Hala (1994). The implication of a successful replication of Chandler and Hala would be 
that even young three-year-olds understand the representational nature of false belief, 
but that traditional (non-participation) false belief and representational change tests fail 
to detect that understanding. 
Do the subjects respond with greater accuracy to look questions 
or to think questions? 
Chandler and Hala (1994) report that young children respond to test questions 
which ask where a certain person will look for an object with greater accuracy than they 
will answer questions which ask where the person will think an object is. The inclusion 
of look questions in the present study is an attempt to replicate Chandler and Hala's 
(1994) results. If subjects answer look questions with greater accuracy than think 
questions, then the present study will have replicated Chandler and Hala's (1994) 
finding. 
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Does accuracy in answering the test questions increase with age? 
Theory theorists such as Gopnik (1993) and Wellman (1990) report findings that 
the ability to understand false belief develops in children at approximately four years of 
age, but it is not apparent whether all three years olds have equal difficulty in 
understanding false belief, or if older three-year-olds evidence a greater understanding 
of false belief than young three-year-olds. If accuracy in answering the test questions is 
found to be higher among older three-year-olds, the finding would support the 
conclusion that the child's understanding of false belief develops significantly between 
the third and fourth birthdays. 
Methodological points. 
Two methodological points are discussed below. The first is a discussion of 
whether theoretical criticisms of the false belief task are applicable to the present study. 
Second, the choice of present test and control questions is discussed. 
The false belief task. 
In part two of the introduction I described the debate in the theory of mind 
literature regarding whether the false belief task is a suitable method of ascertaining 
whether a young child has a representational theory of mind. Recently, several theorists 
have criticised the tendency in the theory of mind literature to describe the 
"developmental shift" from three to four years of age as a shift from a non-
representational to a representational understanding of mental states (Chandler, 1988; 
Harris, 1993; Wellman, 1990). The present study uses false belief and representational 
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change tests because such tests apparently do highlight some kind of developmental 
milestone between three and four years of age. With regard to the present study, it is 
not important exactly what that milestone is; whether three-year-old children are just 
beginning to understand the representational nature of false belief, or are developing a 
different type of understanding of mind. What is important to the present study is that 
the false belief test measures the same understanding of other people's minds (when the 
child is asked about other people's beliefs) as the representational change test measures 
when children answer questions about their own past beliefs. There is only one reason 
to believe that the false belief test and representational change test may be measuring 
different types of understanding, and that is that in the false belief test the child is asked 
questions about the current false belief of another person, whereas in the 
representational change test the child is asked questions about their own past false 
belief. This "present other, past self' problem is discussed in part three of the 
discussion. 
Question structure. 
The question structure used in the present study is derived from the studies of 
Chandler and Hala (1994) and Gopnik and Astington (1988). In the test questions the 
children are asked where the assistant would look for the expected contents of a familiar 
container, and where the assistant would think the expected contents were (Chandler & 
Hala, 1994). Each question provides the child with two forced-choice alternatives 
(Gopnik & Astington, 1988). Each trial includes two control questions, the memory and 
reality questions (see method, p.67), both of which must be answered successfully if the 
trial is to be considered valid. The memory question controls for the possibility that the 
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child's answers are due to an inability to recall past events. The reality question 
controls for the possibility that the child's answers are due to confusion on the child's 
behalf regarding current reality. The structure of the control questions is taken directly 
from Gopnik and Astington (1988). 
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METHOD. 
1. Subjects. 
Forty eight children were recruited from Christchurch childcare centres with the 
written consent of each child's parent or guardian. Twenty of the original forty eight 
subjects failed control questions (see p.67) and were excluded from the study. Testing 
of subjects continued until a total of thirty six children had passed the control questions. 
Subjects were randomly assigned to two groups, with age (in months) and the 
childcare centre attended by each child (which may influence socioeconomic status) 
balanced between groups. One of these groups was a 'participation' group which had 
personal involvement in the preparation of the experimental tasks. The other, 'non-
participation', group was a control group which had no personal involvement in the 
preparation of the experimental tasks. The group, age, and suburb ( of childcare centre) 
of each of the thirty six subjects are listed in table 1. 
2. Materials. 
The props used in each of the five experimental trials are listed in table 2. The 
props are listed in the same order for each trial, i.e., the two soap dishes are used for the 
same purpose in trial A as that for which the two weetbix boxes are used in trial B. The 
trial A props are used in the description of the experimental procedure. 
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Subject Groun Age (in months} suburb of childcare centre 
I E 43 Redcliffs 
2 E 44 Redcliffs 
3 E 38 Shirley 
4 E 38 Shirley 
5 E 43 Riccarton 
6 E 36 Riccarton 
7 E 44 Riccarton 
8 E 42 Sydenham 
9 E 42 Linwood 
IO E 47 Dallington 
11 E 39 Fendalton 
12 E 45 Fendalton 
13 E 45 Cashmere 
14 E 45 Fendalton 
15 E 41 Riccarton 
16 E 38 City centre 
17 E 44 South shore 
18 C 47 Shirley 
19 C 46 Shirley 
20 C 45 Shirley 
21 C 42 Shirley 
22 C 42 Ilam 
23 C 42 Ilam 
24 C 47 Ilam 
25 C 41 Redcliffs 
26 C 44 Addington 
27 C 46 Linwood 
28 C 39 Sydenham 
29 C 39 Dallington 
30 C 47 Dallington 
31 C 40 Sydenham 
32 C 43 Fendalton 
33 C 43 Fendalton 
34 C 45 Riccarton 
35 C 38 Addington 
36 C 43 Avonhead 
Table 1. Table of thirty six subjects, their membership of either the participation group (E for 
experimental) or the non-participation group (C for control), age in months, and suburb of 
childcare centre attended. 
Trial A Trial B Trial C 
2 soap dishes 2 weetbix boxes 2 milo boxes 
2 bars of soap 2 plastic bags of weetbix 2 packets of milo 
icecream cone box icecream container soap pad box 
3 coloured balls 3 small soft toys 3 coloured lollies 
3. Procedure. 
Control Trial 1 
toothpaste box 
tube of toothpaste 
laundry powder box 
3 coloured candles 
Control Trial 2 
biscuit packet 
1 biscuit 
tortilla chip box 
3 pairs coloured glasses 
Table 2. Props for the five trials used with each subject. 
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In this section I will briefly describe the experimental procedure, the three 
experimental manipulations, and the control trials. I will then describe the format of the 
experimental trials in detail. 
Two people conducted the experiment, an experimenter and an assistant. The 
experimenter showed each subject an empty box and a box with appropriate contents. 
Once the assistant had left the room, the experimenter suggested to the child that the 
contents of one box be hidden from the third person in the other, empty box. The 
contents of the first box were replaced with a novel object. The subject was then asked 
questions about the third person's beliefs about the location of the boxes' contents. The 
65 
subject was also asked two control questions. The procedure up to this point is referred 
to hereafter as the false belief component. The third person then returned, feigned 
surprised at the locations of the various objects, and (using sleight of hand) replaced one 
of the boxes with a similar one that had contents which would be unexpected by the 
child. The child opened the box, was surprised by the contents, and was asked 
questions about their own previous beliefs about the box's contents. The second half of 
the procedure is referred to hereafter as the representational change component. The 
experimental procedure is described in detail below. 
The abbreviations 'El' and 'E2' used in the description of the present study refer 
to the 'first experimenter' and 'second experimenter'. In the present study, the first 
experimenter was male and the second experimenter was female. The first experimenter 
asked the subject all test and control questions, and recorded their responses. The 
second experimenter left the area when experimental props were moved about, feigned 
surprise upon discovering a prop's new location, and swapped props for the 
representational change test in each trial. 
Person (self vs. other) manipulation. 
The experimental procedure was run five times per subject, and each of the five 
trials had two parts, the false belief test and the representational change test. In the first 
part, the subject witnessed the deception of E2, and subsequently answered test 
questions which assessed their understanding of false belief in other people. In the 
second part, the subject was deceived, made aware of their own false belief, and asked 
test questions which assessed the subject's understanding of their own false beliefs. 
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Modality (look vs. think) manipulation. 
Within each part of the experimental procedure, the subject was asked two test 
questions, the 'look' question and the 'think' question. Half the subjects were asked the 
'look' question first, and half were asked the 'think' question first. One question 
assessed the subject's understanding of where the target had looked or would look 
(modality: sight), and the other question assessed the subject's understanding of where 
the target thought, or would think a particular object was located (modality: belief). 
Personal involvement manipulation. 
All subjects took part in the experimental exercise, and were asked the same 
questions, but subjects in the non-participation group had no personal role to play in the 
execution of the experimental task. El asked the subject to watch what El did, but the 
subject was not invited to help deceive E2 by (for example) choosing which of three 
coloured balls was to be placed in the soap dish once the soap has been removed (see 
trial description). Subjects in the participation group were asked, in each trial, to 
choose one of three props to replace an object which had been 'hidden' from E2. Test 
question order, order of forced choice alternatives within each question, and trial order 
were all counterbalanced within each subject group (see appendix A). 
Control trials 
Each subject was run through five trials. The five trials were labelled A, B, C, 1, 
and 2. Trials A, B, and C were normal examples of the experimental procedure 
described in the trial description, below. The order in which both the participation and 
non-participation groups underwent trials A, B, and C was balanced between subjects. 
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Trials 1 and 2 were control trials designed to prevent the children from coming to expect 
the surprise in the representational change component. There was no representational 
change component in the control trials. The order of the control trials was not balanced 
between subjects, which were always the third and fifth trials of the five. 
Trial description 
The experimental procedure was run five times per subject, and each of the five 
trials used a different set of props. Scripts for the five trial types in both the 
participation and non-participation groups are in appendix B. The experimental 
procedure for a single trial is summarised below. The props for trial A are used in the 
following description. 
False belief questions. 
Each subject was presented with two containers by the first experimenter (El); a 
soap dish and an icecream cone box. The icecream cone box was opened and shown to 
be empty, and the soap dish was opened to reveal a bar of soap. At this point 
experimenter two (E2) expressed interest in the bar of soap, and El asked E2 to get him 
a pencil (rubber, ruler, etc.) before taking a closer look or smelling the soap. Once E2 
had left the area, El invited the subject to help deceive E2 by hiding the soap in the 
icecream cone box, and replacing it with one of three coloured balls. 
When the soap and coloured balls had been moved, El asked the subject two test 
questions: (Qn.1) "Where will (E2) think the soap is? In the soap dish or in the 
icecream cone box?" and (Qn.2) "Where will (E2) look for the soap? In the soap 
dish or in the icecream cone box?". Both the order of questions within each pair 
68 
(Qn.1/Qn.2) and the order of forced choice alternatives within each question (soap 
dish/icecream cone box) were counterbalanced. 
Control questions. 
El then asked the subject two control questions. Although the order of 
alternatives within the control questions were alternated, the order of the questions 
themselves remained constant. The questions were: (Qn.1) "When you first saw the 
soap, before we moved it, where was it? In the soap dish or in the icecream cone 
box?" and (Qn.2) "Where is the coloured ball now? In the soap dish or in the 
icecream cone box?". 
The first control question (the memory question) was designed to confirm that the 
subject remembered enough information to successfully complete the task. The second 
question (the reality question) was designed to confirm that the subject was not 
confused about current reality. Failure to correctly answer either control question 
invalidated the trial. 
Representational change questions. 
After the subject had answered the control questions E2 entered the area, declared 
a desire to smell/look at the soap, and feigned surprise upon opening the soap dish -
which now contained a coloured ball. While El briefly distracted the subject, E2 then 
discretely swapped the soap dish which contained a coloured ball for a second soap dish 
which contained a bar of soap. El then asked the subject to open the soap dish, and the 
child was (usually) surprised to see that there was soap in the dish rather than a coloured 
ball. 
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At this point El asked the subject two test questions: (Qn.1) "Before you looked 
in the soap dish just now, where did you think the soap was? In the soap dish or in 
the icecream cone box?" and (Qn.2) "Where did you look for the coloured ball? In 
the soap dish or in the icecream cone box?". The order of these two test questions, 
and the order of the forced choice alternatives presented within the questions, was 
counterbalanced. 
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RESULTS 
Twenty of the original forty eight subjects failed the control questions in all three 
experimental trials, and were thus excluded from the study. The mean age of those who 
failed the control questions was 41.3 months, while the mean age of those who passed 
was 42.6 months. The difference between the mean ages was not significant, t ( 46) = 
1.38, ns. Testing of subjects continued until a total of thirty six children had passed the 
control questions in at least one experimental trial. 
A Pearson product-moment correlation was performed on the overall performance 
score and age (in months) of each subject, and there was no significant correlation 
between age and accuracy, r = .14, df = 34, ns. Pearson product-moment correlations 
were performed between age and the false belief (person: other) and representational 
change (person: self) scores of each subject. Age did not correlate significantly with 
either false belief scores, r = .08, df = 34, ns, or representational change scores, r = .13, 
df= 34, ns. 
A three-way ANOVA was performed on the percentage oftest questions answered 
correctly, with two repeated measures factors and one between subjects factor. The first 
repeated measures factor was modality of question. There were two levels of the 
modality factor, 'look' (test questions regarding where E2 or the subject would look, or 
had looked for an object) and 'think' (test questions regarding where E2 or the subject 
would think, or had thought a particular object was). The second repeated measures 
factor was person. The person factor had two levels, 'self (questions testing the child's 
understanding of their own beliefs) and 'other' (questions testing the child's 
understanding of E2's beliefs). The between-subjects factor was group. The group 
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factor had two levels, 'participation' (in which subjects participate by choosing which of 
three props to use in each trial) and 'non-participation' (in which subjects do not 
participate in the execution of the trials beyond answering questions). 
The 'look' questions (variable: modality) were answered with significantly greater 
accuracy (m = 66.0) than the 'think' questions (m = 47.9), F(l,34) = 8.44, p < .01. 
Figure 1 shows the difference between the mean 'look' score and the mean 'think' 
score. The 'self questions (variable: person) were also answered with significantly 
greater accuracy (m = 68.3) than the 'other' questions (m = 45.6), F(l,34) = 7.94, p < 
.01. Figure 2 shows the difference between the mean 'self score and the mean 'other' 
score. There was no significant difference between the participation group (m = 57.4) 
and the non-participation group (m = 56.6), F < 1. 
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Figure I. Difference between the mean 'look' score and the mean 'think' score. 
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Figure 2. Difference between the mean 'self score and the mean 'other' score. 
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The only significant interaction effect was between person and modality, F(l ,34) 
= 9.14, p < .01. Simple tests of main effects were performed on the interaction effect 
between person and modality. The 'self I 'look' question was answered with greater 
accuracy than the 'other'/ 'look' question, F(l,34) = 13.00, p < .01, and the 'self I 
'think' question, F(l,34) = 17.18, p < .01. There was no significant difference between 
'other'/ 'think' and 'other'/ 'look', F < 1, or between 'other'/ 'think' and 'self/ 'think', 
F < 1. Figure 3 shows the interaction effect between person and modality. There was 
no interaction effect between group and person, F < 1. No other effects were 
significant. 
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Figure 3. Interaction effect between person and modality. 
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DISCUSSION 
1. Conclusions. 
Five conclusions can be drawn from the results, based upon the predictions put 
forward in the 'first-person theorist' account (see part three of the introduction). The 
five conclusions are as follows: 
a) Accuracy in answering the test questions did not increase with age. The ability to 
understand the behavioural consequences or representational nature of belief did not 
develop significantly between the third and fourth birthdays. 
b) The self I look question was answered with greater accuracy than the self I think and 
other I think questions. Young children understand the behavioural consequences of 
psychological states such as belief in themselves before they understand the 
representational nature of those states. 
c) The self I look question was answered with greater accuracy than the other I look 
question. Young children understand the behavioural consequences of their own 
psychological states before they understand the behavioural consequences of 
psychological states in others. 
d) No significant difference was found between the accuracy of the participation group 
and that of the non-participation group. Personal involvement of the subject in the 
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experimental task does not appear to increase accuracy on the test questions. The lack 
of the predicted person/ group interaction effect is not interesting, due to the lack of a 
group main effect. If there had been both person and group main effects the lack of an 
interaction effect between the two would have been worth discussion, but in the present 
results the lack of an interaction effect can be explained by the fact that there is no 
significant group effect for person to interact with. 
e) The self I look question was answered with greater accuracy than the other I look, 
self I think, and other I think questions. Young children understand the behavioural 
consequences of their own beliefs before they understand similar consequences of the 
beliefs of others, or the representational nature of belief in either themselves or other 
people. 
2. Implications. 
The present finding that the ability to understand the behavioural consequences or 
representational nature of belief does not develop significantly between the child's third 
and fourth birthday is in agreement with Gopnik (1993), who notes that the ability to 
understand false belief " ... consistently appear(s) at around age four" (p.5). It is possible 
that development of the ability to understand false belief is rapid rather than gradual, 
and does not tend to occur until the child is approximately four years old. The age range 
of subjects in the present study was evenly spread. 
76 
The present finding that the look questions were answered more accurately than 
think questions (at least for self) is a successful replication of a finding of Chandler and 
Hala (1994). 
Gopnik (1993) compares several sources of developmental evidence, some of 
which concern the child's understanding of other people's false beliefs, and some of 
which concern the child's understanding of their own false beliefs. Gopnik reports that 
the age at which children begin to pass the false belief test is approximately the same 
age at which children begin to pass the representational change test. Gopnik concludes 
that the ability to understand false belief, in both self and others, develops as the child 
reaches four years of age. The present finding, that young children understand the 
behavioural consequences of their own beliefs better than they understand the 
behavioural consequences or representational nature of belief in others, runs contrary to 
the findings of Gopnik (1993). 
The present finding suggests that young children have at least an implicit 
understanding of the relationship between their actions and beliefs before they have any 
such understanding of belief in others. Gopnik (1993) claims that young children have 
as much understanding of the psychological states of others as they have of their own 
psychological states. However, Gopnik does not explicitly state that young children 
understand the behavioural consequences of psychological states to the same degree in 
both self and other. If Gopnik's (1993) claims were taken at face value, then the present 
findings would not present any discrepancy, but those claims have wider implications. 
The child's understanding of psychological states includes not only the explicit 
understanding of those states tested by the think questions, but also the implicit 
understanding of the behavioural consequences of those states, which is tested by the 
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look questions. In order to have a complete understanding of belief the young child 
must understand the behavioural consequences of belief, thus the present finding that 
children have a superior understanding of the behavioural consequences of their own 
beliefs is in opposition to the earlier findings of Gopnik (1993 ). 
The discrepancy between the findings reported by Gopnik and those of the present 
study could be due to methodological differences between the two studies. There are 
two noteworthy methodological differences between the studies, described below, one 
of which may account for the discrepancy. Gopnik (1993) compared false belief and 
representational change results from various studies in order to come to the conclusion 
that the child's theoretical understanding of their own false beliefs, and those of other 
people, develop simultaneously. Gopnik's conclusions were, by practical necessity, 
based upon results gained from different subject populations. The present study, on the 
other hand, compared false belief and representational change scores within a single 
subject population. The advantage of testing children's understanding of false belief in 
self and other within a single subject population is that there is less chance of 
methodological faults in individual studies causing a biased result. There is no apparent 
bias which might be caused by the methodological difference described above, but a 
second difference may account for the discrepancy. 
The look questions, used in the present study after Chandler and Hala (1994), were 
not used by Gopnik (1993). The present finding, that subjects answered the self I look 
question with significantly greater accuracy than all other test questions, can be 
explained in a manner which is consistent with Gopnik (1993). It is possible that the 
self I look question can be answered correctly without any understanding of 
psychological states whatsoever, if the child simply recalls where they looked for the 
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missing object in the representational change component of an experimental trial. In 
short, an understanding of the behavioural consequences of false belief may be 
necessary to predict where another person will look, but simple memory recall may be 
all that is needed to say where the subject themselves had looked. 
There is another possible explanation. Subjects may answer the self I look 
question by thinking of where they would look instead of where they did look. Adults 
often employ a similar tactic if they cannot easily remember a past action. For example, 
a person who asks themselves "where did I put my car keys?" will often convert the 
question to "where would I have put my car keys?" in the hope of finding the correct 
answer by retracing their steps. Which of these two explanations of the present finding 
is correct is an empirical issue, and suggestions for its resolution are put forward in part 
four of the discussion. 
The present finding that the personal involvement of subjects in the experimental 
task did not increase accuracy on the test questions runs contrary to the findings of 
Chandler and Hala (1994). The procedure of the present study and that of Chandler and 
Hala are compared in part three of the discussion to see whether this discrepancy can be 
understood. 
The interaction between person (self/other) and modality (look/think) is 
interesting in the context of the major prediction of first-person theory theory, that 
children understand their own psychological states before understanding such states in 
others. The present finding is that the child has an understanding of the behavioural 
consequences of their own beliefs which is greater than their understanding of the 
representational nature of their own beliefs and, more importantly with regard to the 
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first-person theory theory, is also greater than their understanding of the behavioural 
consequences or representational nature of other people's beliefs. 
The results of the present study refute the 'hard' version of theory theory 
described by theorists such as Gopnik (1993), Gopnik and Wellman (1992), and Moses 
and Chandler (1992), unless further empirical testing suggests that children answer the 
self I look question by simple recall rather than a superior understanding of the 
behavioural consequences of one's own false beliefs. Gopnik (1993) describes the 
child's theory of mind as an explanatory construct which is applied equally to one's 
own behaviour, and to the behaviour of others. The present study provides evidence 
that three-year-old children have an understanding of the behavioural consequences of 
their own psychological states which is superior to their understanding of such states in 
others. The present study provides evidence to support the developmental priority of 
self knowledge by demonstrating that three-year-olds are significantly more accurate 
when answering questions about their own belief-based behaviour than they are when 
answering questions about other people's behaviour or beliefs. The young child's 
superior understanding of their own psychological states is all the more impressive 
given claims that it is harder to understand one's own former false beliefs than it is to 
understand one's own current false beliefs (Harris, 1991). 
The results of the present study are compatible with simulation theory. A 
simulation theorist might claim that the children in the present study had a greater 
understanding of the behavioural consequences of their own beliefs (than of the beliefs 
of others) because simulation is required to understand other people's false beliefs, and 
three-year-old children have trouble running such complex simulations, whereas less 
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simulation (i.e., fewer counterfactual steps) 1s required to model the behavioural 
consequences of one's own false beliefs. 
It is possible to claim that simulation of another person's current false beliefs and 
simulation of one's own past false beliefs are equally difficult processes, having the 
same number of counterfactual steps (Harris, 1991 ), and therefore young children 
should not be able to answer questions about their own past false beliefs with any 
greater accuracy than questions about another person's current false beliefs. It is 
possible that the present study did not compare the child's understanding of past 
personal beliefs and the current beliefs of others, but instead compared the child's 
understanding of past personal beliefs and the future beliefs of others. For example, 
when each subject is asked "Where will (E2) think the milo is? In the milo box or in the 
soap pad box?", they are in fact being asked to comment upon a future psychological 
state, which (according to simulation theory) should be of equivalent simulation 
difficulty to a past psychological state (Harris, 1991). Therefore, if the present study did 
compare the child's understanding of their own past beliefs with the future beliefs of 
another person, then it can be argued that the present results are incompatible with 
simulation theory, as it is proposed by Harris (1991). 
The 'first-person theory theory' (introduced in part three of the introduction) is the 
only form of theory theory which is compatible with the present findings, as it allows 
for the possibility that young children may develop a theory of mind which is first used 
to explain one's own behaviour, and is only later applied to the behaviour of others. 
There are two elements which constitute the first-person theorist account: 
developmental priority of self knowledge, and the necessity of personal awareness of 
psychological experience for theory of mind development. The present finding that 
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young children have a greater understanding of the behavioural consequences of their 
own false beliefs than of the false beliefs of others constitutes evidence that self 
knowledge has developmental priority. 
The present findings do not support the necessity of personal awareness of 
psychological experience for theory of mind development. The first-person theory 
theory predicted that if awareness of personal psychological experience was necessary 
during theory of mind development then personal involvement should increase accuracy 
on the self questions to a significantly greater degree than on the other questions. The 
present findings were that there was no such increase in accuracy in the participation 
group. Future versions of first-person theory theory need not propose any role for 
psychological experience in theory of mind development. An alternative explanation of 
the present finding, that there was no significant difference between the participation 
group and the non-participation group, is that the personal involvement manipulation 
did not significantly alter the psychological experience of the participation group. I will 
consider the possibility that the personal involvement manipulation was ineffective in 
part three of the discussion. 
To summarise, the present findings support first-person theory theory, but until 
possible alternative explanations of the evidence have been empirically tested, the 
present study must be considered inconclusive. The results could be explained in terms 
of simulation theory, theory theory, and first-person theory theory. Several variations of 
simulation theory exist which allow it to interpret any results of false belief studies in its 
favour. Further empirical research is needed to determine the validity of simulation 
theory. The present results are incompatible with theory theory, unless it is the case that 
subjects in the present study answered the self I look question through simple recall 
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rather than understanding of false belief. Suggestions for further testing of first-person 
theory theory are presented in part four of the discussion. 
3. Limitations of the present study. 
Failure on control questions. 
Twenty out of the initial forty-eight subjects failed the control questions in all 
three experimental trials. The control questions used in the present study are the same 
as those used in Gopnik and Astington (1988). The control question failure rate 
reported by Gopnik and Astington (four out of fourteen three-year-olds) was lower than 
the rate reported in the present study, and much lower rates were reported by Chandler 
and Bala (1994). The characteristics of the present subject population are described 
below, in an attempt to understand what factors may have contributed to the control 
question failure. 
There was no significant difference between the mean age of those subjects who 
passed the control questions (42.6 months) and the mean age of those who failed the 
control questions ( 41.3 months). The lack of significant age difference between the two 
populations rules out the possibility that the study was biased by the mass failure of the 
younger three-year-olds, who may have had particular difficulties with the control 
questions. The average age of three-year-old subjects run by Gopnik and Astington 
(1988) was 42.7 months, while the average age of subjects in the present study was 42.6 
months, so age difference is not responsible for the discrepancy in control failure rates 
between the two studies. 
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The clear majority of the initial twenty subjects who failed the control questions 
failed the memory question, which tests the child's ability to remember where the 
objects were at the beginning of each trial. Out of a potential sixty failures ( one per 
trial, three trials per subject), those subjects who were excluded from the study failed the 
memory question forty-nine times. In contrast, the reality question was only failed six 
times (also out of a potential sixty). 
It is possible that the mass failure on the memory question can be explained by the 
findings of Taylor, Esbensen, and Bennett (1994). As was noted in part two of the 
introduction, Taylor et al. (1994) found that children as old as four and five years claim 
to have always known information which they have in fact just learned. Although 
young children's tendency to claim that they have always known novel information may 
not be a simple memory deficit, the same phenomenon may be the cause of failure on 
the memory question in the present study. It is possible that the cognitive feature ( or 
lack thereof) which causes some children to claim that they have always known novel 
information may also cause those children to claim that an object has always been in its 
current position. 
Although the effect described by Taylor, Esbensen, and Bennett (1994) may have 
contributed to the high control failure rate of the present study, it is highly improbable 
that the effect is completely responsible, as subjects run by Gopnik and Astington 
(1988) answered the same memory control question with lower failure rates. There is 
no obvious cause for the high control failure rate of the present study, although it is 
possible that the effect described by Taylor et al is a contributing factor. 
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Present other, past self 
An unfortunate methodological feature of the present study is that the subjects 
were asked questions about the current beliefs of another person, while they could only 
be asked questions about their own past beliefs. Researchers cannot ask children to 
reflect upon their current false beliefs, because the moment the child understands the 
belief to have been false it is already a past false belief Normal people do not continue 
to hold beliefs despite knowing them to be false, except in abnormal circumstances, 
such as optical illusions (Schiffman, 1990). 
The methodological necessity of questions about one's own past beliefs means 
that simulation theorists can explain false belief evidence, no matter the result. For 
example, the findings of the present study may be explained easily if simulation theory 
is correct. Simulation theory states that the young child should have a superior 
understanding of their own psychological states, because they can simply 'read' those 
states from an internal model of the child's own mind. The ability to simulate that 
model in order to understand the psychological states of others develops over time, so 
the child will have a developing understanding of other people's psychological states 
which is not as comprehensive as their understanding of their own psychological states. 
Simulation theory can also be used to explain experimental evidence which contradicts 
the present study. Harris (1993) explains the findings of Gopnik (1993), that young 
children have no greater understanding of their own psychological states than they have 
of other people's states, by claiming that one's own past false beliefs are just as hard to 
simulate as another person's current false beliefs. 'Hard' theory theorists such as 
Gopnik (1993) cannot criticise the present study for using present tense test questions in 
the false belief test and past tense questions in the representational change test, because 
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to do so would be criticising the methodology (and thus conclusions) of their own 
studies, which use the same methodology. 
Cognitive involvement and non-involvement. 
Chandler and Hala (1994) claim that even young three-year-olds can pass a false 
belief test if they have personal involvement in the execution of the test. The present 
study failed to replicate Chandler and Hala's (1994) finding that personal involvement 
of the child in the false belief task increased the child's accuracy in answering the false 
belief test questions. 
There are two methodological distinctions to be made between the studies 
conducted by Chandler and Hala (1994) and the present study, although neither 
distinction would account for the present failure to replicate Chandler and Hala' s 
findings. The first difference is that three of the four studies conducted by Chandler and 
Hala did not include non-participation groups, although the non-participation group in 
the fourth study was the same as that in the present study. The second difference is that 
the subjects in Chandler and Hala (1994) completed either a false belief test or a 
representational change test, whereas subjects in the present study completed both. 
It may be that the failure of the present study to replicate Chandler and Hala's 
results is due to methodological limitations of the present study, rather than there being 
no effect to replicate. There may have been insufficient differentiation between 
cognitive involvement of experimental subjects and non-involvement of control subjects 
in the present study. Although the non-participation subjects did not have the choice 
of which props to use in each trial, and did not have the same degree of "hands on" 
involvement as the participation subjects, these manipulations did not appear to be 
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major factors in determining the degree of each child's enthusiasm or interest in the task 
(which would presumably correspond to that child's degree of 'cognitive involvement'). 
Suggestions for heightening the differentiation between the experiences of participation 
and non-participation subjects are discussed in the next section. 
4. Future research. 
Further differentiation of involvement and non-involvement. 
There may be a lack of differentiation between the experiences of the subjects in 
the participation group and those in the non-participation group. Greater differentiation 
between the experiences of these two groups may allow the successful replication of 
Chandler and Hala's (1994) findings. The essence of the problem is the need to 
maintain an equivalent level of interest and enthusiasm between the two groups, while 
increasing the cognitive involvement of the participation group or decreasing the 
cognitive involvement of the non-participation group. 
One possibility is to have the participation group actually participate in the trials, 
as they do in the present study, while the non-participation group is forced into a passive 
role by watching examples of the trials played from video tape. The lack of "right here, 
right now" salience might decrease cognitive involvement, while the novelty of the 
video should keep children interested enough to answer the questions. 
Testing the first-person theory theory. 
There are two elements which constitute the full version of first-person theory 
theory as it is described in part three of the introduction. The second element is the 
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necessity of personal awareness of psychological experience for theory of mind 
development. If awareness of one's own psychological experience is necessary for 
development of an understanding of one's own psychological states, then young 
children and children with autism who do not understand their own psychological states 
should not have such an awareness. Flavell et al (1993) are among those who have 
begun to explore the area of the young child's understanding of psychological 
experience, but such studies are not common, and do not include children with autism. 
Studies which investigate the autistic child's understanding of psychological experience 
should be carried out to find whether autistic children have any less understanding of 
psychological experience than normal children, and if so, to find out what aspects of the 
autistic child's understanding are typically impaired. 
Studies could be carried out which would investigate the possibility that young 
children may have a greater understanding of their own psychological experience than 
they have of the psychological experiences of others. The type of 'stream of 
consciousness' questionnaire employed by Flavell et al (1993) could be modified to test 
children's understanding of certain features of human psychological experience, both in 
themselves and others. Qualitative studies could be carried out which would question 
individual children in depth about their understanding of the psychological states or 
experiences of themselves and others. 
Further empirical studies are needed to test 'hard' theory theory, first-person 
theory theory, and simulation theory. In part two of the discussion it was explained that 
the present study constitutes evidence against 'hard' theory theory, unless subjects in the 
present study were answering the self I look question by simple recall rather than 
understanding the behavioural consequences of false belief. A study could be carried 
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out in which the self I look question ("where did you look for the object?") is balanced 
with an alternative self I look question which, if answered correctly, shows that the child 
understands the behavioural consequences of false belief ( such as "where would you 
look for the object?"). If the original self I look question is answered with significantly 
greater accuracy than the alternative version, then it is being answered by simple recall. 
Studies designed to empirically test first-person theory theory and simulation 
theory should be carried out, but the two theories are extremely hard to differentiate on a 
practical level. For example, despite the different cognitive mechanisms postulated by 
the two theories to account for the child's developing understanding of psychological 
states, both theories predict that self knowledge has developmental priority and that 
understanding of one's own psychological states (aswell as other people's) develops 
over time. I do not claim that simulation theory and first-person theory theory are 
empirically indistinguishable, but I cannot suggest what empirical basis upon which the 
two theories might be distinguished. The apparent empirical similarity of simulation 
theory and first-person theory theory only serves to emphasise the practical 
unimportance of asking whether the child's understanding of psychological states is 
theoretical in nature, or based upon a process of simulation. 
In conclusion, the present study has two significant findings which are of interest 
in the context of the proposed first-person theory theory. The first is that young 
children understand the behavioural consequences of their own psychological states 
before they understand the representational nature of those states, which is a replication 
of a finding of Chandler and Hal a (1994 ). The second is that young children understand 
the behavioural consequences of their own psychological states before they understand 
the behavioural consequences or representational nature of psychological states in 
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others, which is refutation of the findings of Gopnik (1993). In short, the young child 
understands the behavioural consequences of their own false beliefs significantly better 
than they understand the behavioural consequences of other people's false beliefs, or the 
representational nature of their own or other people's false beliefs. The implications of 
these findings, which can be explained by both simulation theory and a simplified 
version of first-person theory theory, have been discussed. Further research must now 
be undertaken to decide which theory best explains the development of the child's 
understanding of belief. 
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Subject conditions table. 
110 
SUBJECT GROUP Test question order Forced choice order Trial order 
1 E 1,2 U,E ABC 
2 E 1,2 U,E BCA 
3 E 1,2 U,E CAB 
4 E 1,2 U,E ABC 
5 E 1,2 U,E BCA 
6 E 1,2 U,E CAB 
7 E 1,2 E,U ABC 
8 E 1,2 E,U BCA 
9 E 1,2 E,U CAB 
10 E 1,2 E,U ABC 
11 E 1,2 E,U BCA 
12 E 1,2 E,U CAB 
13 E 2,1 U,E ABC 
14 E 2,1 U,E BCA 
15 E 2,1 U,E CAB 
16 E 2,1 U,E ABC 
17 E 2,1 U,E BCA 
18 E 2,1 U,E CAB 
19 E 2,1 E,U ABC 
20 E 2,1 E,U BCA 
21 E 2,1 E,U CAB 
22 E 2,1 E,U ABC 
23 E 2,1 E,U BCA 
24 E 2,1 E,U CAB 
25 C 1,2 U,E ABC 
26 C 1,2 U,E BCA 
27 C 1,2 U,E CAB 
28 C 1,2 U,E ABC 
29 C 1,2 U,E BCA 
30 C 1,2 U,E CAB 
31 C 1,2 E,U ABC 
32 C 1,2 E,U BCA 
33 C 1,2 E,U CAB 
34 C 1,2 E,U ABC 
35 C 1,2 E,U BCA 
36 C 1,2 E,U CAB 
37 C 2,1 U,E ABC 
38 C 2,1 U,E BCA 
39 C 2,1 U,E CAB 
40 C 2,1 U,E ABC 
41 C 2,1 U,E BCA 
42 C 2,1 U,E CAB 
43 C 2,1 E,U ABC 
44 C 2,1 E,U BCA 
45 C 2,1 E,U CAB 
46 C 2,1 E,U ABC 
47 C 2,1 E,U BCA 
48 C 2,1 E,U CAB 
E=experimental C=control / U=unexpected contents E=expected contents 
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Appendix B. 
Scripts. 
SCRIPT 
EXPERIMENTAL GROUP 
PROP A 
El opens the icecream cone box. What's in this box? 
child it's empty/nothing 
El opens the soap dish. What's in the soap dish? 
child soap 
E2 that looks like pretty soap. (El), can I smell that soap? 
El okay, but could you go and get me a pencil first please? 
E2 okay. E2 leaves area. 
112 
El to child: I've got an idea. Let's hide the soap from (E2) in the icecream cone box, 
where she won't see it. El indicates for child to do so. Why don't you put one of these 
coloured balls in the soap dish. El offers range of three coloured balls, indicates to 
soap dish. Close the soap dish, so (E2) doesn't see. El asks two test questions. El 
then asks two control questions. 
E2 re-enters area. Hi guys. Here's your pencil, (El). Can I smell the soap now? 
El sure, you can. 
E2 opens soap dish and feigns surprise at coloured ball. Shows coloured ball to El 
and child. Hey! Where did the soap go? I don't understand. While El briefly distracts 
the child, E2 turns away and discretely swaps the soap dish which contains the 
coloured ball for a soap dish which contains soap. 
El to child: Let's put the soap back again. Can you do that? Child opens soap dish to 
find soap, and is surprised. El asks two test questions. 
SCRIPT 
EXPERIMENTAL GROUP 
PROPB 
El opens the icecream container. What's in this container? 
child it's empty/nothing 
El opens the weetbix box. What's in the weetbix box? 
child weetbix 
E2 that looks like yummy weetbix. (El), can I taste that weetbix? 
El okay, but could you go and get me a ruler first please? 
E2 okay. E2 leaves area. 
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El to child: I've got an idea. Let's hide the weetbix from (E2) in the icecream 
container, where she won't see it. El indicates for child to do so. Why don't you put 
one of these animals in the weetbix box. El offers range of three soft toys, indicates to 
weetbix box. Close the weetbix box, so (E2) doesn't see. El asks two test questions. 
El then asks two control questions. 
E2 re-enters area. Hi guys. Here's your ruler, (El). Can I taste the weetbix now? 
El sure, you can. 
E2 opens weetbix box and feigns surprise at soft toy. Shows soft toy to El and child. 
Hey! Where did the weetbix go? I don't understand. While El briefly distracts the 
child, E2 turns away and discretely swaps the weetbix box which contains the soft toy 
for a weetbix box which contains weetbix. 
El to child: Let's put the weetbix back again. Can you do that? Child opens weetbix 
box to find weetbix, and is surprised. El asks two test questions. 
SCRIPT 
EXPERIMENTAL GROUP 
PROPC 
El opens the soap pad box. What's in this box? 
child it's empty/nothing 
El opens the milo box. What's in the milo box? 
child milo 
E2 that looks like yummy milo. (El), can I taste that milo? 
El okay, but could you go and get me a pen first please? 
E2 okay. E2 leaves area. 
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El to child: I've got an idea. Let's hide the milo from (E2) in the soap pad box, where 
she won't see it. El indicates for child to do so. Why don't you put one of these lollies 
in the milo box. El offers range of three coloured lollies, indicates to milo box. Close 
the milo box, so (E2) doesn't see. El asks two test questions. El then asks two 
control questions. 
E2 re-enters area. Hi guys. Here's your pen, (El). Can I taste the milo now? 
El sure, you can. 
E2 opens milo box and feigns surprise at lolly. Shows lolly to El and child. Hey! 
Where did the milo go? I don't understand. While El briefly distracts the child, E2 
turns away and discretely swaps the milo box which contains the lolly for a milo box 
which contains milo. 
El to child: Let's put the milo back again. Can you do that? Child opens milo box to 
find milo, and is surprised. El asks two test questions. 
SCRIPT 
EXPERIMENTAL GROUP 
PROP 1 
El opens the laundry powder box. What's in this box? 
child it's empty/nothing 
El opens the toothpaste box. What's in the toothpaste box? 
child toothpaste 
E2 is that peppermint toothpaste?. (El), can I taste that toothpaste? 
El okay, but could you go and get me a felt pen first please? 
E2 okay. E2 leaves area. 
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El to child: I've got an idea. Let's hide the toothpaste from (E2) in the laundry 
powder box, where she won't see it. El indicates for child to do so. Why don't you put 
one of these candles in the toothpaste box. El indicates for child to do so. Let's close 
the toothpaste box, so (E2) doesn't see. El asks two test questions. El then asks two 
control questions. 
E2 re-enters area. Hi guys. Here's your felt pen, (El). Can I taste the toothpaste 
now? 
El sure, you can. 
E2 opens toothpaste box and feigns surprise at candle. Shows candle to El and child 
Hey! Where did the toothpaste go? I don't understand. 
El to child: Why don't you put the toothpaste back again. El indicates for child to 
open the toothpaste box and put the toothpaste back. 
SCRIPT 
EXPERIMENTAL GROUP 
PROP2 
El opens the chip box. What's in this box? 
child it's empty/nothing 
El opens the biscuit packet. What's in the biscuit packet? 
child a biscuit 
E2 that biscuit looks really yummy. (El), can I taste that biscuit? 
El okay, but could you go and get me a rubber first please? 
E2 okay. E2 leaves area. 
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El to child: I've got an idea. Let's hide the biscuit from (E2) in the chip box, where 
she won't see it. El indicates for child to do so. Why don't you put this pair of glasses 
in the biscuit packet. El indicates for child to do so. Let's close the biscuit packet, so 
(E2) doesn't see. El asks two test questions. El then asks two control questions. 
E2 re-enters area. Hi guys. Here's your rubber, (El). Can I taste the biscuit now? 
El sure, you can. 
E2 opens biscuit packet and feigns surprise at glasses. Shows glasses to El and child 
Hey! Where did the biscuit go? I don't 1mderstand. 
El to child: Why don't you put the biscuit back again. El indicates for child to open 
the biscuit packet and put the biscuit back. 
SCRIPT 
CONTROL GROUP 
PROP A 
El opens the ice cream cone box. What's in this box? 
child it's empty/nothing 
El opens the soap dish. What's in the soap dish? 
child soap 
E2 that looks like pretty soap. (El), can I smell that soap? 
El okay, but could you go and get me a pencil first please? 
E2 okay. E2 leaves area. 
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El to child: I've got an idea. I'm going to hide the soap from (E2) in the icecream 
cone box, where she won't see it. El does so. I'm also going to put one of these 
coloured balls in the soap dish. El does so. I'll close the soap dish, so (E2) doesn't see. 
El asks two test questions. El then asks two control questions. 
E2 re-enters area. Hi guys. Here's your pencil, (El). Can I smell the soap now? 
El sure, you can. 
E2 opens soap dish and feigns surprise at coloured ball. Shows coloured ball to El 
and child. Hey! Where did the soap go? I don't understand. While El briefly distracts 
the child, E2 turns away and discretely swaps the soap dish which contains the 
coloured ball for a soap dish which contains soap. 
El to child: I'm going to put the soap back again. El opens soap dish to find soap, 
and child is surprised. El asks two test questions. 
SCRIPT 
CONTROL GROUP 
PROPB 
El opens the icecream container. What's in this container? 
child it's empty/nothing 
El opens the weetbix box. What's in the weetbix box? 
child weetbix 
E2 that looks like yummy weetbix. (E 1 ), can I taste that weetbix? 
El okay, but could you go and get me a ruler first please? 
E2 okay. E2 leaves area. 
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El to child: I've got an idea. I'm going to hide the weetbix from (E2) in the icecream 
container, where she won't see it. El does so. I'm also going to put one of these 
animals in the weetbix box. El does so. I'll close the weetbix box, so (E2) doesn't see. 
El asks two test questions. El then asks two control questions. 
E2 re-enters area. Hi guys. Here's your ruler, (El). Can I taste the weetbix now? 
El sure, you can. 
E2 opens weetbix box and feigns surprise at soft toy. Shows soft toy to El and child 
Hey! Where did the weetbix go? I don't understand. While El briefly distracts the 
child, E2 turns away and discretely swaps the weetbix box which contains the soft toy 
for a weetbix box which contains weetbix. 
El to child: I'm going to put the weetbix back again. El opens weetbix box to find 
weetbix, and child is surprised El asks two test questions. 
SCRIPT 
CONTROL GROUP 
PROPC 
El opens the soap pad box. What's in this box? 
child it's empty/nothing 
El opens the milo box. What's in the milo box? 
child milo 
E2 that looks like yummy milo. (El), can I taste that milo? 
El okay, but could you go and get me a pen first please? 
E2 okay. E2 leaves area. 
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El to child: I've got an idea. I'm going to hide the milo from (E2) in the soap pad 
box, where she won't see it. El does so. I'm also going to put one of these lollies in the 
milo box. El does so. I'll close the milo box, so (E2) doesn't see. El asks two test 
questions. El tllen asks two control questions. 
E2 re-enters area. Hi guys. Here's your pen, (El). Can I taste the milo now? 
El sure, you can. 
E2 opens milo box and feigns surprise at lolly. Shows lolly to El and child Hey! 
Where did the milo go? I don't understand. While El briefly distracts the child, E2 
turns away and discretely swaps the milo box which contains the lolly for a milo box 
which contains milo. 
El to child: I'm going to put the milo back again. El opens milo box to find milo, and 
child is surprised El asks two test questions. 
SCRIPT 
CONTROL GROUP 
PROPl 
El opens the laundry powder box. What's in this box? 
child it's empty/nothing 
El opens the toothpaste box. What's in the toothpaste box? 
child toothpaste 
E2 is that peppermint toothpaste?. (El), can I taste that toothpaste? 
El okay, but could you go and get me a felt pen first please? 
E2 okay. E2 leaves area. 
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El to child: I've got an idea. I'm going to hide the toothpaste from (E2) in the laundry 
powder box, where she won't see it. El does so. I'm also going to put one of these 
candles in the toothpaste box. El does so. I'll close the toothpaste box, so (E2) doesn't 
see. El asks two test questions. El then asks two control questions. 
E2 re-enters area. Hi guys. Here's your felt pen, (El). Can I taste the toothpaste 
now? 
El sure, you can. 
E2 opens toothpaste box and feigns surprise at candle. Shows candle to El and child. 
Hey! Where did the toothpaste go? I don't understand. 
El to child: I'm going to put the toothpaste back again. El opens toothpaste box and 
puts the toothpaste back. 
SCRIPT 
CONTROL GROUP 
PROP2 
El opens the chip box. What's in this box? 
child it's empty/nothing 
El opens the biscuit packet. What's in the biscuit packet? 
child a biscuit 
E2 that biscuit looks really yummy. (El), can I taste that biscuit? 
El okay, but could you go and get me a rubber first please? 
E2 okay. E2 leaves area. 
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El to child: I've got an idea. I'm going to hide the biscuit from (E2) in the chip box, 
where she won't see it. El does so. I'm also going to put this pair of glasses in the 
biscuit packet. El does so. I'll close the biscuit packet, so (E2) doesn't see. El asks 
two test questions. El then asks two control questions. 
E2 re-enters area. Hi guys. Here's your rubber, (El). Can I taste the biscuit now? 
El sure, you can. 
E2 opens biscuit packet and feigns swprise at glasses. Shows glasses to El and child. 
Hey! Where did the biscuit go? I don't understand. 
El to child: I'm going to put the biscuit back again. El opens biscuit packet and puts 
the biscuit back. 
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Appendix C. 
Information sheet. 
University of Canterbury 
Department of Psychology 
Early childhood learning project: 
Children's understanding of belief. 
INFORMATION 
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Your three-year-old child is invited to participate as a subject in the research 
project "Children's understanding of belief'. The aim of this project is to determine 
whether any three-year-old children can pass tests which evidence an understanding of 
their own beliefs, while not being able to evidence a similar understanding of other 
people's beliefs (or vice versa). 
Your child's involvement in this project will be to participate in the following 
activities: 
1. Helping one researcher to trick another by replacing the soap in a soap dish with 
coloured balls, and answering questions about what the tricked researcher believes, such 
as: "Where will Jenni think the soap is, in the soap dish or in the icecream cone box?" 
2. Opening a soap dish, finding that it has unexpected contents (soap instead of 
coloured balls), and answering questions about what the child believed, such as: 
"Before you looked in the soap dish just now, where did you think the soap was; in the 
soap dish or in the icecream cone box?" 
The results of the project may be published, but you are assured of the complete 
confidentiality of data gathered in this investigation. The identity of participants will 
not be made public and only group data will be reported. 
The project is being carried out by Matthew Twyman under the direction of Dr. 
Gillian Rhodes. Matthew Twyman can be contacted at 366 7001 7197. Dr. Rhodes can 
be contacted at 326 5531. We will be pleased to discuss any concerns you may have 
about your child's participation in the project. 
The project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human 
Ethics Committee. 
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AppendixD. 
Consent form. 
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Child's name: ..................................................... . 
Child's birthdate: .............................................. .. 
CONSENT FORM: 
CHILDREN'S UNDERSTANDING OF BELIEF 
I have read and understood the description of the above-named project. On this basis I 
agree to allow my child to participate as a subject in the project, and I consent to 
publication of the results of the project with the understanding that anonymity will be 
preserved. I understand also that my child may at any time withdraw or be withdrawn 
from the project, including withdrawal of any information they have provided. 
Signed .. . .. .. . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . .. .. . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . Date ............................................ .. 
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Appendix E. 
Data sheet. 
Subject#: 
Subject name: 
Sex: M F 
Daycare centre: 
[ ] soap dish 
[ ] Where will (E2) think the soap is? 
Date: 
Condition: experimental 
control 
Birth date: 
In the soap dish [ ] or in the icecream cone box [ ] ? 
[ ] Where will (E2) look for the soap? 
In the soap dish [ ] or in the icecream cone box [ ] ? 
* 
--- When you first saw the soap, before we moved it, where was it? 
In the soap dish [ ] or in the icecream cone box [ ] ? 
--- Where is the soap now? 
In the soap dish [ ] or in the icecream cone box [ ] ? 
* 
[ ] Before you looked in the soap dish just now, where did you think the soap was? 
In the soap dish [ ] or in the icecream cone box [ ] ? 
[ ] Where did you look for the coloured ball? 
In the soap dish [ ] or in the icecream cone box [ ] ? 
[ ] weetbix box 
[ ] Where will (E2) think the weetbix is? 
In the weetbix box [ ] or in the icecream container [ ] ? 
[ ] Where will (E2) look for the weetbix? 
In the weetbix box [ ] or in the icecream container [ ] ? 
* 
--- When you first saw the weetbix, before we moved it, where was it? 
In the weetbix box [ ] or in the icecream container [ ] ? 
--- Where is the weetbix now? 
In the weetbix box [ ] or in the icecream container [ ] ? 
* 
[ ] Before you looked in the weetbix box just now, where did you think the weetbix was? 
In the weetbix box [ ] or in the icecream container [ ] ? 
[ ] Where did you look for the animal? 
In the weetbix box [ ] or in the icecream container [ ] ? 
[ ] milo box 
[ ] Where will (E2) think the milo is? 
In the milo box [ ] or in the soap pad box [ ] ? 
[ ] Where will (E2) look for the milo? 
In the milo box [ ] or in the soap pad box [ ] ? 
* 
--- When you first saw the milo, before we moved it, where was it? 
In the milo box [ ] or in the soap pad box [ ] ? 
--- Where is the milo now? 
In the milo box [ ] or in the soap pad box [ ] ? 
* 
[ ] Before you looked in the milo box just now, where did you think the milo was? 
In the milo box [ ] or in the soap pad box [ ] ? 
[ ] Where did you look for the lolly? 
In the milo box [ ] or in the soap pad box [ ] ? 
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[ ] toothpaste box ( control trial) 
[ ] Where will (E2) think the toothpaste is? 
In the toothpaste box [ ] or in the laundry powder box [ ] ? 
[ ] Where will (E2) look for the toothpaste? 
In the toothpaste box [ ] or in the laundry powder box [ ] ? 
* 
--- When you first saw the toothpaste, before we moved it, where was it? 
In the toothpaste box [ ] or in the laundry powder box [ ] ? 
--- Where is the toothpaste now? 
In the toothpaste box [ ] or in the laundry powder box [ ] ? 
[ ] biscuit packet ( control trial) 
[ ] Where will (E2) think the biscuit is? 
In the biscuit packet [ ] or in the laundry powder box [ ] ? 
[ ] Where will (E2) look for the biscuit? 
In the biscuit packet [ ] or in the laundry powder box [ ] ? 
* 
--- When you first saw the biscuit, before we moved it, where was it? 
In the biscuit packet [ ] or in the laundry powder box [ ] ? 
--- Where is the biscuit now? 
In the biscuit packet [ ] or in the laundry powder box [ ] ? 
COMMENTS: 
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Appendix F. 
Data summary file. 
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other other self self other other 
think look ctrll ctrl2 think look think look ctrll 
A A A A A A B B B 
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 
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self self other other self self 
ctrl2 think look think look ctrll ctrl2 think look 
B B B C C C C C C 
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
1 0 A 0 1 1 1 I 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 
1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
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Appendix G. 
Excel input table. 
accuracy (%) 
other self 
think look think 
1 50 0 50 
1 67 0 100 
1 0 0 33 
1 67 100 67 
1 100 0 50 
1 50 100 50 
1 0 0 33 
1 100 100 67 
1 0 67 33 
1 100 100 100 
1 0 33 0 
1 100 100 33 
1 100 67 100 
1 100 0 100 
1 0 0 50 
1 0 0 100 
1 0 0 0 
2 100 100 0 
2 100 100 33 
2 50 50 0 
2 100 100 0 
2 0 33 67 
2 0 0 100 
2 0 0 100 
2 100 100 100 
2 0 0 0 
2 100 100 0 
2 100 100 100 
2 0 50 50 
2 0 0 100 
2 0 0 0 
2 0 0 100 
2 0 100 0 
2 0 0 100 
2 50 100 50 
2 50 100 0 
group 1 = experimental (participation) group. 
group 2 = control (non-participation) group. 
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overall age 
look performance (mths) 
50 38 43 
100 67 44 
100 33 38 
100 83 38 
100 63 43 
100 75 36 
100 33 44 
67 83 42 
67 42 42 
100 100 47 
33 17 39 
100 83 45 
67 83 45 
100 75 45 
100 38 41 
50 38 38 
100 25 44 
100 75 47 
100 83 46 
100 50 45 
100 75 42 
67 42 42 
100 50 42 
100 50 47 
100 100 41 
100 25 44 
100 75 46 
0 75 39 
100 50 39 
100 50 47 
100 25 40 
100 50 43 
100 50 43 
0 25 45 
100 75 38 
50 50 43 
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AppendixH. 
ANO VA summary table, means, and simple tests of main effects. 
Type Ill sums of squares 
source df sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value 
Group 1 22.325 
subject<Group> 34 73731.085 
person 1 18785.141 
person * Group 1 455.530 
person * subjec ... 34 80448.546 
modality 1 11097.200 
modality * Group 1 2736.089 
modality* subj ... 34 44710.488 
person * modality 1 8127.585 
person* modali ... 1 472.308 
person * modali ... 34 30247.602 
Dependent: Accuracy 
Means Table 
Effect: modality 
Dependent:Accuracy 
think 
look 
count 
72 
72 
Means Table 
Effect: person 
Dependent: Accuracy 
other 
self 
Means Table 
count 
72 
72 
Mean 
47.917 
65.986 
Mean 
45.611 
68.292 
Effect: person * modality 
Dependent:Accuracy 
other, think 
other, look 
self, think 
self, look 
count 
36 
36 
36 
36 
Mean 
44.000 
47.222 
51.833 
84.750 
22.325 .010 .9198 
2168.561 
18785.141 7.939 .0080 
455.530 .193 .6636 
2366.134 
11097.200 8.439 .0064 
2736.089 2.081 .1583 
1315.014 
8127.585 9.136 .0047 
472.308 .531 .4712 
889.635 
Std. Dev. Std. Error 
42.803 5.044 
42.658 5.027 
std. Dev. Std. Error 
45.633 5.378 
38.395 4.525 
Std. Dev. Std. Error 
45.287 7.548 
46.561 7.760 
40.423 6.737 
28.271 4.712 
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Simple tests of main effects performed upon the interaction between person and modality. 
effect MSn DFn DFe MSe F p 
person at think 1100.076 1 34 1752.983 .628 .434 
person at look 25812.651 1 34 1502.786 17.177 .000 
modality at other 115.370 1 34 734.974 .157 ,694 
modality at self 19109.415 1 34 1469.675 13.002 .001 
